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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
“A man of genius makes no mistakes. 
His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery.” 
Ullysses (1922), James Joyce (1882-1941) 
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ERROR MONITORING 
Making errors is part of life. Mostly, it’s not the error itself but the 
way you react to it that is important. By investigating what went wrong 
instead of ruminating about being wrong, you can in fact learn something 
from your error. By doing this you make your human error truly a portal of 
discovery. In industry there are many examples of human errors that turned 
out to be very beneficial for the company’s growth. Like for example the 
legend of Ivory soap. Proctor and Gamble wanted to come to the soap 
market with a new white soap in the late 1800’s. When one of their 
employee’s one day went to lunch he forgot to switch off the soap mixing 
machine. By the time he got back the soap turned out to be extra frothy 
because of the extra air that got into it. At that point they could have thrown 
the mixture away and start over from scratch. However, they decided to use 
the mixture and to sell the bars of soap. From then on their floating soap was 
sold all over the world. It’s a legend though, as research in 2004 revealed 
that in fact the floating soap was an invention of one of the chemists at 
Proctor and Gamble. Nonetheless, it is still a good illustration of how the 
reaction after making an error is far more important than making the error 
itself. 
Table 1. Quotes about erring of ancient philosophers. 
Venia dignus error est humanus 
Titus Livius (59 BC - AD 17) 
Humanum fuit errare, diabolicum est per animositatem in errore 
manere 
Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354 – 430) 
Errare humanum est, perseverare 
autem diabolicum, et tertium non datur 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (often known simply as Seneca; ca. 4 BC – AD 65) 
Cuiusvis errare:insipientis nullius nisi, in errore perseverare 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC - 43 BC) 
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Making errors is such an important part of being a human that it is 
not surprising that ancient philosophers have written about it. A few of their 
quotes are presented in Table 1. Remarkably, they do not focus on the act of 
making an error. The central message all of these great thinkers have is that 
making errors is not really a problem; however, it becomes a problem when 
you persist in it.  
In the late-60s error monitoring research in experimental psychology 
kicked off with the hallmark studies of Rabbitt and Laming (Rabbitt, 1966; 
Laming, 1968). Both researchers investigated human error monitoring on the 
behavioural level. These researchers were also more interested in behaviour 
after making an error than in the error itself. They reported that people are 
capable of correcting most of their errors on the spot. On top of that, the 
phenomenon of post-error slowing was described. Apparently, correct 
responses are slower when they follow an error compared to when they 
follow another correct reaction. In the work presented in the following 
chapters, errors are typically incorrect key presses in computer tasks. Mostly, 
a modified version of the Eriksen Flanker task is used (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974). As can been seen in Figure 2, participants are presented with a target 
that is surrounded by two stimuli on each side. These surrounding stimuli are 
called flankers. The task of the participants is to categorise the target 
according to the side the arrow is pointing. When the target arrow points to 
the left, participants have to press the left button and vice versa. Mostly, in 
half of the trials the target and the flankers are the same stimuli. In that case 
we call the trial a compatible trial because all the information that is 
presented on the screen is compatible with the correct answer. In half of the 
trials the flankers are pointing in the opposite direction of the target. This 
type of trial is referred to as incompatible trials, as most information on the 
screen is incompatible with the correct response. Errors are made when the 
wrong button is pressed. 
In this dissertation we will broaden the knowledge about the 
immediate reaction, both behavioural and neuronal, people have after 
committing an error. A new account, named the orienting account will be 
described and hypotheses made by this account will be investigated. In this 
introduction some theoretical background of error monitoring and used 
methods will be described shortly. Chapter 2 is set up as a second 
introduction chapter where the orienting account will be proposed.  
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BEHAVIOURAL ADJUSTMENTS FOLLOWING ERRORS  
POST-ERROR SLOWING 
Probably, the most reported behavioural adjustment after making an 
error is the observation that people tend to slow down on the subsequent 
trial. This effect is better known as post-error slowing (PES) and is the core 
effect studied in this dissertation. Back in 1966 Rabbitt was the first 
researcher to report this remarkable finding. His results are presented in 
Figure 1; correct reaction times are slower following an error than the mean 
correct reaction times. He interpreted this slowing as a precaution for not 
erring on the next exercise. PES has been shown to be stable when 
participants are retested over periods ranging from 20 minutes, a couple of 
weeks (Segalowitz et al., 2010), even when PES is measured several months 
after the first test (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. Response times of correct response, errors, error corrections 
and correct responses following errors in both a 10 choice and a 4 choice task. 
Post-error slowing is shown by the slower reaction times at EC + N responses 
than the mean correct responses. From Rabbitt (1966). 
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POST-ERROR ACCURACY 
Apart from reaction times, also accuracy is measured after making 
an error and compared to after responding correctly. Although, the post-error 
slowing effect is reported very consequently, this is not the case for post-
error accuracy changes. The three possible outcomes have been reported in 
several articles. That is post-error accuracy improvement (e.g. Laming, 
1968; Marco-Pallares, Camara, Münte, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008; Maier, 
Yeung, & Steinhauser, 2011). In this case, fewer errors are made after an 
error compared to after a correct response. It could be assumed that PES 
results in improved performance. However, in other studies relatively more 
errors are made after errors than after correct responses (e.g. Rabbitt & 
Rodgers, 1977; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Steinborn, Flehmig, 
Bratzke, & Schröter, 2012). Here, you could assume that the process that 
leads to slower reaction times also leads to less correct behaviour, in other 
words, that PES is caused by processes that interfere with performance. 
Finally, also no difference between post-error and post-correct accuracy (e.g. 
Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003; King et al., 2010) have been reported.  
POST-ERROR REDUCTION OF INTERFERENCE 
Ridderinkhof (2002) added to the two previous post-error 
behavioural adjustments the finding that effects of interference are reduced 
after errors. He presented participants with a Simon task (Simon, 1969). This 
is a conflict inducing task because the stimuli are presented for example on 
the left or the right sides of the screen and the required responses also have 
this horizontal dimension. An example of this task is presented in Figure 2. 
In this version of the Simon task you have to press the right button when a 
star is presented and press the left button when a circle is presented. 
Therefore, a star presented on the right side on the screen is a compatible 
stimulus, whereas a circle presented on the right side of the screen is an 
incompatible stimulus.  
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Figure 2. Illustration of two typical congruency tasks. A Simon task 
(Simon, 1969) and an Eriksen Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). 
Examples of compatible and incompatible stimulus presentations are provided 
both with a correct response and an incorrect response. 
An incompatible stimulus mostly results in slower and more error-
prone behaviour, and is better known as the compatibility or the congruency 
effect. Ridderinkhof reported that this congruency effect is smaller when you 
just made an error than after a correct response. An example of this effect is 
presented in Figure 3. This was explained by the fact that an error evokes a 
heightened cognitive control which results in a smaller influence of the 
incongruent stimulus. Several studies indicate that PES and PERI are 
independent (although Carp and Compton, 2009 found a correlation) and are 
produced by different neuronal networks (De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, 
& Sabbe, 2004; Ridderinkhof, 2002; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 
2010). 
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Figure 3. Bar chart that shows a smaller compatibility effect after 
committing an error compared to after responding correctly. This effect is 
better known as “post-error reduction of interference. The presented data are 
only for illustrating purpose. 
THEORIES OF ERROR MONITORING 
Where functional theories hold that error processing and post-error 
adjustments aim to improve performance on the following trial(s), non-
functional theories explain PES in terms of reduced cognitive processing 
after errors. In the following I present the most prominent theories in both 
categories briefly, as they are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
FUNCTIONAL THEORIES 
Functional theories describe slowing as a strategy to reduce the 
likelihood of subsequent errors. The conflict monitoring theory, formulated 
by Botvinick and colleagues (2001) and updated in 2004 (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), is one of 
the most influential and investigated theories about performance monitoring. 
This model has two major components, the conflict monitor, located in the 
dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex (dACC) and a system for applying 
cognitive control, presumably located in the PreFrontal Cortex (PFC). The 
ACC is divided into a dorsal “cognitive” division and a ventral “affective” 
division (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). The dACC monitors the degree of 
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conflict and sends a signal to the PFC to call for cognitive control. Within 
this framework, errors tend to elicit high levels of conflict because both the 
executed erroneous response and the not executed correct response are 
active. Conflict detection increases cognitive control by increasing the 
response threshold resulting in slower and more accurate performance. In 
this theory, post-error slowing is framed in a more cautious response style in 
order to perform better on the next trial. The CMT was originally tested in a 
connectionist model (Botvinick et al., 2001). Indeed, they found larger 
response conflict on error trials than on correct trials. 
Later, this model has been refined by Yeung, Botvinick, and Cohen 
(2004). The model for the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is 
presented in Figure 4. A different version of the Flanker task than the one 
presented in Figure 2 is used. Instead of arrows the letters H and S are used. 
In this case participants have to categorise the letters by pressing for 
example the left button when the target is H and the right button when the 
target is S. The model consists of three layers of units. In the input layer the 
possible stimulus presentations are represented by six position-specific letter 
units. Both the H and the S can be presented centrally or on the left or on the 
right side of the computer screen. The response layer has a unit for each 
response, namely the left response and the right response. The third layer is 
an attentional layer with three units, one for every possible location in the 
stimulus (left, right and central). 
Information is sent through the model by bi-directional excitatory 
weights between the layers, represented by the black lines in the model. The 
lines with an arrow represent the conflict monitoring feedback loop which is 
presumably located in the PFC. When conflict is detected in the response 
layer this information is sent to the dACC, which is the conflict monitor. 
This conflict monitor will call for cognitive control by the PFC. Cognitive 
control will be applied by biasing input from the attention layer. The 
attention layer will increase the attention directed to the target, which is 
presented centrally on the screen. By doing this, the corresponding response 
will be activated. Response conflict is measured by computing a 
multiplication of the response unit activations. When both responses have 
high activation, their product will also be large and as a consequence 
response conflict will be large. When one of both response units crosses an 
arbitrary response threshold, the corresponding response will be produced. 
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Figure 4. The letters H and S designate the stimulus input, which can 
occur on the left (l/L), in the center (c/C) or on the right (r/R) side of the 
computer screen. The black lines indicate bidirectional excitatory weights 
between input, attention and response layers. The arrows represent the conflict 
monitoring feedback loop. Figure adapted from Yeung, Botvinick and Cohen, 
2004. 
Evidence for this theory has been provided by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. For example the hypothesis that post-
error adjustments are triggered by signals from the PFC has been supported 
by showing a correlation between pMFC activity and PES (Garavan, Ross, 
Murphy, Roche, & Stein, 2002; Chevrier & Schachar, 2010). This 
correlation is, however, not consistently found (Gehring & Fencsik, 2001). 
Danielmeier and Ullsperger (2011) suggested in their review on post-error 
adjustments that the mixed findings regarding this correlation could be 
explained by an indirect relation between PES and the performance 
monitoring system. In fMRI studies presented in the next paragraph about 
the inhibition account it is shown that PES is linked to the performance 
monitoring system via a decrease in activity in the motor system (King, 
Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, 
Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011). 
The inhibition account (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Marco-Pallares et al., 
2008) has much in common with the conflict monitoring theory. It states that 
after error commission, selective suppression or inhibition of response 
activation occurs. PES correlates with an increase in beta band power which 
is associated with motor inhibition processes (Marco-Pallares et al., 2008; 
Kühn et al., 2004; Swann et al., 2009). Evidence for this account can be 
22      INTRODUCTION 
found in fMRI studies (King et al., 2010; Danielmeier et al., 2011) that 
investigated the relation between posterior medial frontal cortex activity and 
post-error behavior. In these studies a relationship between post-error 
slowing and decreased motor activation was observed. King et al. presented 
their participants with a modified Simon task (see Figure 2 for an illustration 
of a basic Simon task). Female and male faces were presented on the left or 
on the right side of the screen. The task was to classify the gender by 
pressing the left or the right button. In half of the trials the stimulus 
presentation side was incompatible with the correct response button. By 
using faces as stimuli, the researchers could measure changes in the 
Fusiform Face Area (FFA) (Kanwisher et al., 1997). This area is known to 
be active exclusively when faces are being processed. King and colleagues 
found that after making an error, more attention was given to the faces. This 
was seen by increased activity of the FFA. At the same time the 
sensorimotor cortex was suppressed. These changes in FFA en SMC 
covaried with individual measures of PES and PERI. Importantly, although 
PES correlated with decreased SMC activity, errors were not followed by 
improved accuracy. The setup of the study by Danielmeier and colleagues 
was similar. Again, a modified Simon task was used in which coloured dots 
had to be classified. These dots were moving to the right or moving to the 
left side of the screen. Activity in areas that encode colours was increased on 
post-error trials, whereas activity in motion-encoding areas was decreased. 
They also found a decrease in motor system activity that correlated with 
PES. 
A third theory that cannot be left out from this brief overview is the 
reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). This theory 
integrates findings on reward processing and reinforcement learning. Studies 
on reward processing in primates show a phasic increase or decrease in 
activity of the dopamine system when events are better or worse 
(respectively) than expected (Schultz, 2000, 2002). In most cases, errors are 
events that are worse than expected. These dopaminergic reinforcement 
signals are used for selecting and reinforcing the motor controllers to 
perform the ongoing task optimally. 
NON-FUNCTIONAL THEORIES 
In recent years, the traditional functional theories for post-error 
slowing were challenged. For instance, it was demonstrated that patients 
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with severe mediofrontal lesions, including ACC, showed PES (Stemmer, 
Segalowitz, Witzke, & Schönle, 2004). Moreover, functional theories predict 
that accuracy would increase after errors, an observation that has often not 
been observed (e.g. Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Cheyne et al., 2009; Steinborn 
et al., 2012). These and other data (see Chapter 2) gave rise to so-called 
non-functional accounts that explain PES in terms non-strategic 
mechanisms.  
The bottleneck error-monitoring theory (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; 
Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) is based on the principle of a bottleneck. 
Imagine being at a festival with 3000 people that only has one exit. What 
happens when all of a sudden some trees that are on the festival site start to 
burn? Everyone will try to escape by using that one exit. This will cause a 
severe bottleneck at the exit. When translating that to error monitoring, the 
central information processor in our brain is the single exit on the festival 
site. The error monitoring processes that take place when making an error 
also have to be processed by that same capacity-limited information 
processor. Together with error monitoring processes, the next task also has 
to be processed. This bottleneck leads to slower and less accurate 
performance when a task immediately follows an error. However, when 
there is enough time between the error and the following trial, compensatory 
mechanisms, like post-error slowing, can be implemented to prevent 
subsequent mistakes. 
A similar explanation is postulated in the bidirectional model for 
attention lapses (Cheyne, Carriere, Solman, & Smilek, 2011) where errors 
caused by lapses in attention can on their turn induce dips in attention. A 
third non-functional account explains PES in terms of persistent 
malfunctioning (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Gehring & 
Knight, 2000), where it is argued that the error is caused by a lapse of 
attention which lingers on to the following trial. 
In this dissertation, the orienting account will be described. In most 
reaction time tasks in experimental psychology, the number of errors is very 
small. From the learning psychology literature we know that surprising 
events tend to evoke an orienting response. This is a short lived disturbance 
of cognitive processes accompanied by several reactions in the autonomic 
nervous system (ANS) like for example heart rate deceleration, skin 
conductance changes and pupil dilation. The orienting account states that 
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post-error slowing is a reaction to the infrequent nature errors have in most 
experimental studies. Evidence for this account is provided in the following 
chapters. 
ORIENTING RESPONSE 
Because the term “orienting response” (OR) is used numerously in 
the following chapters, I will provide some background about this innate 
reflex that has been studied by numerous researchers up till now. The 
orienting response, also known as the “orienting reflex”, was first described 
by Ivan Sechenov (1863) in his book Reflexes of the brain. Later on, Ivan 
Pavlov (1927) referred to it as the “what is it” reflex (p. 12) “It is this reflex 
which brings about the immediate response in man and animals to the slightest 
changes in the world around them, so that they immediately orientate their 
appropriate receptor organ in accordance with the perceptible quality in the agent 
bringing about the change, making full investigation of it.” Sokolov (1963) 
further investigated this reflex and found that the OR is accompanied by 
increased skin conductance and heart rate deceleration. He also described the 
phenomenon of habituation. After several incidences of the same stimulus 
the OR becomes smaller and eventually disappears, this process is called 
habituation. When the stimulus changes however, dishabituation takes place. 
A renewed OR is evoked by this ‘new’ stimulus. Hajcak, McDonald and 
Simons (2003) reported error-related modulations in the ANS. Errors were 
accompanied by larger skin conduction and greater heart rate deceleration. 
THE ERP TECHNIQUE 
The elektro-encephalogram (EEG) is a technique that has a very 
high temporal resolution; however, the information regarding the anatomical 
origin of the electrical signal is less exact. In contrast, other neuro-imaging 
techniques like Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and fMRI have better 
spatial resolution but poor temporal resolution. When EEG is measured 
during an experimental task involving specific events (for example stimuli or 
responses) we can examine epochs of the EEG that reflect neural processes 
uniquely associated with those events. An event-related potential (ERP) is 
simply a voltage relative to a specific time-locked event. It is a time-varying 
scalp field that results from the summation of electromagnetic activity 
generated by neuronal populations in different parts of the brain (Otten & 
Rugg, 2005). Psychologically, ERPs represent neural manifestations of 
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specific information-processing activities associated with stimulus or 
response events (Bartholow & Amodio, 2009). 
In an ERP experiment the EEG is recorded from 32, 64, 128 or more 
electrodes that are mounted in an elastic cap that has electrode positioned 
over the entire scalp surface. From the amplifiers, the raw signals are 
digitized onto a computer and recorded (Hillyard & Kutas, 1983). 
Afterwards a signal averaging procedure is performed to extract the ERPs 
time-locked to specific stimulus or response.  
 
Figure 5. Idealized picture of obtaining an ERP waveform based on the 
presentation of an auditory stimulus (S). The P3 for example is the positive 
deflection occurring 300ms after stimulus presentation. The figure is taken 
from Hillyard and Kutas, 1983. 
In Figure 5, an example of segments extracted of the EEG can be 
observed. Each segment shows the activity locked to the onset of an auditory 
stimulus (S). The averaged ERP waveform is the averaged signal of all the 
segments. The resulting averaged ERP waveforms consist of a sequence of 
positive (P) and negative (N) voltage deflections. These deflections are 
called peaks, waves, or components. In Figure 5, some of the peaks are 
labelled P1, N1, P2, N2, and P3. The number in the component name usually 
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refers to the timing in the wave form. The P3 for example is a positive peak 
occurring 300 ms after stimulus presentation. Depending on the 
experimental variables of the tasks, researchers make functional 
interpretations of the ERP components. 
ERROR-RELATED ERP COMPONENTS 
The Error-Related Negativity (ERN/NE) 
The first deflection observed locked to the erroneous response is a 
negative voltage deflection in the event-related brain potential peaking 
between 0 en 100ms after the erroneous response (see Figure 6) and thought 
to be generated by the ACC (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Dikman & 
Allen, 2000; Ghering, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000), usually referred to as the 
error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990) or 
the error negativity (NE; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 
1991). The ERN pops up very fast after making an error and occurs even 
before participants are aware that a mistake has been made (Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2001). This component seems to be apparent on correct responses as well 
(Falkenstein et al., 2000; Vidal, Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000). 
Both the ERN and the correct- related negativity (CRN) have a similar scalp 
topography and time-course. The amplitude of the CRN is, however, 
generally smaller than the ERN. A source-localisation study has 
demonstrated that the ERN and CRN share a common generator in the 
rostral cingulate zone (Roger, Benar, Vidal, Hasbroucq, & Burle, 2010). The 
functional significance of the CRN is still unclear. Several proposals have 
been reported like for example the uncertainty of a correct response (Coles et 
al., 2001; Pailing et al., 2002) or a coactivation of correct and incorrect 
responses (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000; Scheffers et al., 1996; Vidal et al., 
2000). 
The ERN/NE was originally described as a mismatch signal when 
the representation of the desired response did not match with the 
representation of the actual response. Therefore, the amplitude should be 
directly related to the degree of mismatch between the correct and erroneous 
response. This hypothesis was confirmed by several ERP studies (Bernstein 
et al., 1995; Falkenstein et al., 1995; Scheffers et al., 1996). The ERN is also 
integrated in the earlier described reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). The reinforcement learning theory states that the ERN is 
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modulated by the impact of the dopamine signals on the ACC. Therefore, 
small ERNs are associated with phasic increases in dopamine activity. In 
other words, small ERNs are apparent when ongoing events are better than 
expected. Also the opposite is predicted by the reinforcement learning 
theory, large ERNs appear when ongoing events are worse than expected. In 
the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) the ERN reflects the activation of 
the conflict-monitoring system following error commission.  
 
Figure 6. On the left the response-locked ERN is presented. On the 
right the feedback stimulus-locked FRN is shown. This figure is taken from 
Walsh and Anderson, 2012. 
 
The Error-Related Positivity (PE) 
The error positivity (Pe) is a positive slow wave maximal at centro-
patietal sites that peaks approximately 200-400 ms after the onset of the 
erroneous response. In Figure 7 grand-average ERP waveforms that are 
response-locked are presented. Two-hundred milliseconds after making an 
error a slow wave positive potential develops, whereas this is not the case 
after a correct response. Although the PE follows the ERN, they are not 
always modulated in the same manner. While the ERN can be measured 
after unaware errors, the PE is modulated by error awareness. Perceived 
errors are accompanied by a more pronounced PE than unperceived errors 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Endrass, Franke, & Kathmann, 2005). This 
dissociation between the ERN and the PE is further supported by a source-
localisation study of Herrmann, Römmler, Ehlis, Heidrich, and Fallgatter 
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(2004). They reported that the source of the ERN was located in medial 
prefrontal areas, whereas the PE originated more rostral within the ACC. 
 
Figure 7. Response-locked ERP waveform representing the PE. The 
figure is adapted from Larson, Clayson and Baldwin, 2012. 
Remarkably, the Pe and the P3 component seem to have much in 
common in terms of morphology and scalp topography (Davies, Segalowitz, 
Dywan, & Pailing, 2001; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Hajcak, McDonald, & 
Simons, 2003; O’Connell et al., 2007). The P3 is a positive stimulus-locked 
slow wave appearing between 200 and 400 ms after the onset of a surprising 
event (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). The P3 has generally been 
associated with the processing of unexpected events (Sutton, Braren, Zubin, 
& John, 1965; for a review, see Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). 
Later on, the P3 has been subdivided into two subcomponents, namely the 
P3a and the P3b. Whereas the P3a is more sensitive to the novelty of events 
(Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) the P3b is ought to be sensitive to the 
amount of attentional resources allocated to a stimulus (Polich, 2007). In a 
study of Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, and Wijnen (2009) the relation between PE 
and P3 was investigated. The amplitude of the PE in a Simon task covaried 
with the effect of a manipulation known to influence stimulus saliency as 
reflected in the P3. Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, and Pailing (2001) also 
reported a correlation between the size of the stimulus-locked P3 and the 
response-locked PE in a Flanker task. It seems that the PE is a P3-like 
reaction to the motivational and salient nature most errors have.  
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THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
This dissertation started with the observation that traditional 
accounts for error-monitoring were challenged by a growing body of 
empirical data. We developed the hypothesis that post-error slowing might in 
fact not be a strategic adaptation, but rather a by-product of paying attention 
to the error. Around the same time, other labs developed other non-
functional accounts for PES (see above). The similarities and differences 
will be discussed in the general discussion. 
In chapter 2 the orienting account is presented. The orienting 
account explains slowing after committing an error as an orienting response 
due to the infrequent nature of most errors. In order to manipulate the 
amount of errors participants make, we developed an adaptive paradigm that 
adjusted the discriminability of the target according to the recent 
performance in a four choice colour discrimination task. This was done by 
calculating on each trial the mean accuracy of the previous 20 trials. When 
this number was larger than the pre-set value of, for example, 55% then the 
stimulus would be slightly darker on the next trial. By doing this, we created 
3 within-subjects conditions where we aimed respectively at 35%, 75% and 
55% accuracy. In a second experiment an irrelevant stimulus was presented 
on 25% or 75% of the trials. This was done to verify the prediction of the 
orienting account that the frequency of an event influences the behaviour 
afterwards. In chapter 3 these experiments were expanded by two 
experiments. Because in chapter 2 immediate feedback was given, it could 
that the results found were reactions to the infrequent visual presentation of 
the feedback, instead of infrequent error-specific reactions. Another reason 
to set up this experiment was to replicate the results in a different range of 
accuracies. This time we aimed at 50%, 70% and 90% accurate trials in the 
three conditions. One group saw immediate feedback, whereas another group 
saw feedback after every fiftieth trial. The third reason to do this experiment 
was to discard the continuous use of the adaptive algorithm. This would 
allow us to measure post-error accuracies in each condition. In chapter 3, 
each condition started with a block of trials during which the adaptive 
algorithm defined the darkness at which that particular participant performed 
at the predefined level of accuracy. In chapter 4 the same rationale was used 
in an ERP study. However, this time we completely removed the adaptive 
paradigm and used a difficult and an easy version of a modified flanker task. 
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The difference in difficulty was created by using a 4:2 stimulus:response 
mapping and a 8:2 stimulus:response mapping of a speeded flanker task. No 
immediate feedback was given, which enabled us to investigate error-
response specific potentials, namely the ERN and the PE. At the same time, 
we could correlate behavioural adjustments with these error-related 
potentials. In chapter 5 a new paradigm is presented to investigate 
behavioural processes that occur immediately after committing an error 
without relying on post-error accuracies. A modified flanker task was used 
in order to have enough errors to analyse. The response on the flanker task 
was immediately followed by a rapid visual presentation (RSVP) of single 
digits. In this RSVP one letter was presented in 95% of the trials. 
Participants were asked to type the letter they just saw, or to indicate that 
they had not seen a letter. This experiment was done both with immediate 
feedback on the flanker task and without immediate feedback. In a third 
experiment we aimed to investigate the impact on target detection in the 
RSVP when this started with an irrelevant red or green stimulus which was 
presented frequently or infrequently. In chapter 6 we investigated how the 
presentation of feedback signals might modulate post-error behavioural 
adjustments by manipulating feedback frequency and magnitude 
experimentally in an arrow flanker task with different reinforcement 
contexts. Participants were either rewarded for correct trials, or punished for 
error trials. Moreover, both the reward and the punishment groups were 
further divided in a high and low reward/punishment condition, resulting in 
four between-subjects conditions. In each of these conditions, occasional 
infrequent feedback was presented.  
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CHAPTER 2 
POST-ERROR SLOWING: AN ORIENTING 
ACCOUNT
1
 
 
 
 
 
It is generally assumed that slowing after errors is a cognitive 
control effect reflecting more careful response strategies after errors. 
However, clinical data are not compatible with this explanation. We 
therefore consider two alternative explanations, one referring to the 
possibility of a persisting underlying problem and one on the basis of the low 
frequency of errors (orienting account). This latter hypothesis argues that 
infrequent events orient attention away from the task. Support for the 
orienting account was obtained in two experiments. Using a new 
experimental procedure, Experiment 1 demonstrated post-error slowing 
after infrequent errors and post-correct slowing after infrequent correct 
trials. In Experiment 2, slowing was observed following infrequent irrelevant 
tones replacing the feedback signals. 
                                                          
1
 Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Opstal, F. V., Gevers, W., Fias, W., & 
Verguts, T. (2009). Post-error slowing: an orienting account. Cognition, 111(2), 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive control is responsible for adjusting our information 
processing network to context demands and goal settings. Empirically, 
behavioural adaptation effects are taken as a reflection of cognitive control 
processes. Perhaps one of the most replicable effects is the observation that 
responses are slower after an error than after a correct trial. Cognitive control 
theories attribute post-error slowing to adaptive control mechanisms that 
induce more careful behaviour to reduce the probability of error commission. 
Conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001), for instance, explains post-error slowing in terms of a decrease of 
baseline response activation after errors which is functionally equivalent to 
increasing the response threshold. As a result, post-error trials are predicted 
to be slower and more accurate. Conflict monitoring theory adequately 
simulated the data by Laming (1968) who indeed observed this pattern. 
Consequently, post-error slowing is now widely accepted as a cognitive 
control effect, and is used as a marker for cognitive control in clinical studies 
(e.g., Bogte, Flamma, van der Meere, & van Engeland, 2007; Kerns, Cohen, 
MacDonald III, Johnson, Stenger, Aizenstein, & Carter, 2005; Sergeant & 
van der Meere, 1988). 
Although the combination of post-error slowing and accuracy 
increase has been reported (Laming, 1968), an overview of the literature 
suggests that increased accuracy after errors is usually not observed (e.g., 
Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Hajcak, MacDonald & Simons, 2003; Rabbitt & 
Rogers, 1977). Hence, other explanations need to be considered. Gehring, 
Goss, Coles, Meyer and Donchin (1993) suggested that post-error slowing 
could be caused by the persistence of the malfunctioning process that led to 
an error on the previous trial, leading to a correlation in task efficiency 
across trials. This account does not only predict post-error slowing, but also 
a post-error accuracy decrease.  
In the present paper, we propose that post-error slowing is caused by 
the relative infrequency of errors which causes attentional capture. This was 
already hinted at by Burns (1965, in Rabbitt & Phillips, 1967, pp 38): 
“Burns himself preferred to suggest that the occurrence of an error was 
followed by an orienting response which inhibited rather than facilitated 
subsequent responses”. In line with this, Barcelo, Escero, Corral and 
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Perianez (2006) reported slowing after infrequent events (oddballs) and 
interpreted this in terms of a time-consuming orientation to the oddball and a 
reorientation to the task. We refer to this hypothesis as the orienting account. 
The orienting account makes two unique predictions. First, when 
errors are more frequent than correct trials, correct trials should elicit the 
orienting response and slowing should be observed after infrequent correct 
trials. On the basis of a persisting problem and the cognitive control 
hypothesis, one should always predict post-error slowing irrespective of the 
relative frequencies of errors and correct responses. Second, if the orienting 
response causes the slowing after errors, it is also predicted that orienting 
towards completely irrelevant unexpected signals should slow down 
subsequent responding.  
Both predictions were tested in the following experiments. In 
Experiment 1 we manipulated the error rates by means of an adaptive 
program. We predict post-error slowing when errors are infrequent and post-
correct slowing when correct trials are infrequent. In Experiment 2 we 
replace the feedback signal by an irrelevant high or low tone. We predict 
slowing when an infrequent tone follows the response. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixteen students (15 female; average age of 18 years and 8 months) 
of Ghent University participated in turn for course credits.  
Procedure 
Stimuli were 0.4° by 0.4° colored squares presented centrally on a 
white background. The brightness of the colors was adjusted in order to keep 
every participant’s performance to a prespecified level (35, 55 or 75 % 
accuracy). Colors are described according to the HSV color model with three 
parameters: hue (0-360), saturation (0-100) and value (0-100). The four 
colors that were used in the practice trials were red (20, 100, 80), yellow (60, 
100, 80), green (120, 100, 80) and blue (240, 100, 80). Participants 
responded to each of the four colors with one of the four buttons on an E-
prime response box, with left and right middle and index fingers. Four 
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different color-to-button mapping rules were used, and participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the mappings.  
Each trial begins with a central fixation cross (500 ms) followed by 
the stimulus which is presented until a response button is pressed. This is 
immediately followed by a feedback signal (J for correct, F for incorrect, 
corresponding to the words ‘juist’ and ‘fout’ in Dutch). Participants received 
instructions related to the meaning of the feedback stimuli. The feedback 
stimuli were presented for 500 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. 
The intertrial interval was 600 ms (100ms blank and 500ms fixation cross). 
In a first practice block, 30 trials were presented without response 
deadline. In a second block of 100 practice trials, a response deadline of 
1000 ms is introduced together with a feedback signal, ‘T’ for too slow. This 
is followed by three blocks of 400 trials with a short break after every 200 
trials. The three blocks correspond to the frequency manipulation where 
every participant runs through the 35, 55 and 75 % accuracy condition. Two 
different orders are used (35-55-75 and 75-55-35) and subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of the orders. In the 75 condition, the initial color 
value is set to 80, in the 55 condition to 70 and in the 35 to 60. On every 
trial, we calculate the accuracy of the last 20 trials and adjust the color value 
accordingly where color value increases when accuracy was too low and 
color value decreases when accuracy was too high. With constant hue and 
saturation levels, adjusting the color value affects the brightness of the 
stimuli, where lower values make stimuli darker. We adjust the brightness 
with 1 value point (from 74 to 73 for instance) after every trial. These 
settings were tested in a small pilot experiment with different subjects. 
The data are analyzed with one between-subjects factor (order) and 
two within-subjects factors. A first within-subject factor is the accuracy 
condition (35, 55 or 75 % accuracy) and a second is the accuracy of the 
previous trial (correct or incorrect). Post-error slowing is investigated on 
correct RTs and is evident from a main effect of the factor previous 
accuracy, indicating that on average correct RTs depend on the accuracy 
status of the preceding trial.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data of one participant were excluded from the analyses because 
of an unusually (>2SD) high proportion of late responses. All trials before 
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the prespecified accuracy percentage was reached were excluded, as well as 
trials with RTs faster than 100 ms and after the response deadline. In total 
26.70% of the trials were deleted. The order in which the conditions were 
administered did not yield significant effects. 
In correct RTs, there was no main effect of accuracy condition (35, 
55 or 75), F(2, 26) < 1, ns, or of accuracy of previous trial, F(1, 13) < 1, ns. 
The interaction between accuracy condition and accuracy of the previous 
trial was significant, F(2, 26) = 22.19, p < .001 (see Figure 1). In the 75 
condition we observed post-error slowing (M = 25.08, SD = 26.16; t(14) = 
3.71, p < .001). Importantly, in the 35 condition, we observed post-correct 
slowing (M = -49.78, SD = 47.25; t(14) = -4.08, p < .001). No effect was 
found in condition 55 (M = 5.43, SD = 39.88; t(14) = 0.53, p = .30). 
 
Figure 1. Correct reaction times for trials following correct trials 
(previous correct) and trials following incorrect trials (previous incorrect) in 
the three accuracy conditions (35%, 55% and 75% accuracy). Vertical bars 
indicate one standard error. 
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In the error proportions, there was an obvious main effect of 
accuracy condition, F(2, 26) = 386.24, p < .001. The adaptation procedure 
worked excellently in the 75 and the 55 condition with 75.4% and 57.6% 
accuracy respectively, but a small deviation was observed in the 35 
condition with 40.1% accuracy. There was also an effect of accuracy of the 
previous trial, F(2, 26) = 144.08, p < .001, with more errors after errors than 
after correct trials. Although the interaction between previous accuracy and 
accuracy condition, F(2, 26) = 3.95, p < .05, indicates differences in the size 
of the post-error accuracy decrease, it was significant in all conditions (35: 
M = 16.76, SD = 7.47, t(14) = 8.69, p < .001; 55: M = 26.01, SD = 12.25, 
t(14) = 8.23, p < .001; 75: M = 22.90, SD = 11.79, t(14) = 7.52, p < .001).  
Because performance is affected by the brightness (value) of the 
colors, we also ran an ANOVA with the same factors on color value as a 
dependent measure. This analyses revealed that in the three accuracy 
conditions the brightness on average was lower after errors than after correct 
trials, F(1, 13) = 711.96, p < .001. The lower brightness after errors indicates 
that it takes more than one trial to adjust performance in the desired 
direction. Most importantly, the interaction between previous accuracy and 
accuracy condition in correct RTs cannot be explained in terms of 
differences in color brightness. 
The results indicate that slowing occurred after infrequent events, 
whether this was an error or a correct trial. This was predicted by the 
orienting account, and cannot be explained by the cognitive control or the 
persisting-problem account. Further, there were more errors after an error 
than after a correct response, independent of error frequency. This effect is 
most likely caused by the fact that, on average, color value is lower after an 
error than after a correct trial. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
To further investigate the influence of expectancy on slowing, we 
designed a second experiment where an irrelevant signal substitutes the 
feedback signal. If post-error slowing is caused by an orienting response, one 
would also expect slowing after an infrequent irrelevant signal. Indirectly, 
this was already suggested in Barcelo et al. (2006) where occasionally (26 
times in a block of 140 trials) a novel unique sound was presented. The 
slowing after these novel sounds is in line with our orienting account. 
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Because all novel sounds were only presented once in that study, we wanted 
to investigate possible slowing after irrelevant sounds where the frequency 
more closely matched the frequency of errors in typical experiments. 
Further, our baseline trials also contained auditory stimuli (but frequent 
ones).  
METHOD 
Participants 
Sixteen undergraduate students (2 females, average age of 19 years) 
of Ghent University participated for course credits. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that the 
feedback signal was replaced by a completely irrelevant tone (700 Hz or 
1000Hz). This irrelevant stimulus was unrelated to the performance of the 
subject. A standard tone was presented in 75% of the trials, while an oddball 
tone was presented in 25% of the trials or vice versa, counterbalanced over 
subjects. The four colors were presented with a fixed value of 80. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A t-test on correct RTs revealed a significant effect of frequency, 
t(15) = -2.41, p < .05 (see Figure 2). Subjects responded faster after an 
irrelevant stimulus that was presented in 75% of the trials (M = 516 ms, SD 
= 9.91 ms) compared to one that was presented in only 25% of the trials (M 
= 525 ms, SD = 11.02 ms). A t-test on the proportion errors revealed no 
effect of the frequency of the irrelevant stimulus, t(15) < 1, ns. 
As only 8.88% errors are made, the orienting account predicts post-
error slowing. There was a significant effect of accuracy of the previous trial 
on correct RT, t(15) = 3.26, p < .01, but not on the error proportions, 
t(15)<1, ns. Subjects responded slower after an error trial (M = 543.12, SD = 
62.87) than after a correct trial (M = 518.32, SD = 40.27). Because of the 
low error rate (in combination with the low oddball frequency), the 
interaction between post-error slowing and post-oddball slowing could not 
be measured. 
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Figure 2. Correct reaction times for trials following frequent and 
infrequent irrelevant acoustic stimuli. Vertical bars indicate one standard 
error. 
 
The results demonstrate slowing after infrequent irrelevant acoustic 
signals in line with the orienting account for post-error slowing. Moreover, 
the lack of a post-error accuracy effect in combination with post-error 
slowing also fits the orienting account. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1, it was demonstrated that post-error correct RT is 
modulated by the frequency of errors. Post-error slowing was observed when 
errors were infrequent, but when errors were frequent, slowing was observed 
after correct trials. This cannot be explained by mechanisms of adaptive 
cognitive control or by the persistence of an underlying problem that caused 
the error. The hypothesis that infrequent events slow down task-relevant 
processing was further confirmed in Experiment 2 where slowing was 
observed on trials that followed irrelevant and infrequent acoustic signals. 
The orienting account captures clinical data that were previously 
hard to explain. For instance, there is the dissociation between post-error 
slowing and two other error-related effects in patients with frontal lobe 
damage. Gehring and Knight (2000) demonstrated that frontal lobe patients 
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did not show decreased response force on errors and a reduction of error 
corrections compared to control subjects. However, these patients showed 
regular post-error slowing. In response, Cohen, Botvinick, and Carter (2000) 
postulated that there were multiple adaptive control mechanisms, one 
including frontal cortex (response force effects and error correction) and one 
bypassing frontal cortex (post-error slowing). In our account, post-error 
slowing is not considered as an adaptive effect, obviating the need for 
multiple adaptive mechanisms.  
Further support for the orienting account comes from 
electrophysiological studies that additionally indicate that the account is also 
applicable in experimental tasks without external feedback. When there is no 
external feedback, an error leads to internally generated feedback which is 
probably not all that different from externally presented feedback. In an 
experiment without external feedback Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, 
Band, & Kok (2001) demonstrated post-error slowing only when participants 
were aware of the errors, indicating the need of an internally generated 
feedback signal. Moreover, ERP studies show similar ERP components 
following error feedback and errors without feedback; in particular, feedback 
related negativity (FRN) and P3 are observed in the former case, error 
related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe) in the latter (e.g., Leuthold 
& Sommer, 1999). In both cases the positive components (P3 and Pe) are 
more related to post-error slowing than the frontal negativities (FRN and 
ERN; e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), and interestingly, these positive 
components are traditionally interpreted as indices of an orienting response 
(e.g., Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001). Similarly, Crone, Somsen, Van 
Beek and Van Der Molen (2004) demonstrated heart rate deceleration after 
error feedback, which was also observed by Hajcak et al. (2003) on errors in 
a task without feedback. Interestingly, also this heart rate deceleration is an 
index of the orienting response (e.g., Hare, 1973). Consequently, 
electrophysiological and heart rate measurements on tasks with and without 
feedback indicate an important role for orienting responses towards errors 
and error feedback. 
There is one aspect of the data that deserves further attention, and 
that is the observation that the size of post-oddball slowing in Experiment 2 
is considerably smaller than the size of post-error slowing in Experiment 1 
although the relative frequency of errors and oddballs match. This is most 
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likely caused by differences in relevance (significance) of the signals, a 
factor known to influence the orienting response (e.g., Bernstein, 1969). This 
difference boils down to the fact that, in Experiment 2, the oddballs are 
completely irrelevant, whereas the feedback signals in Experiment 1 are not. 
Alternatively, this difference in slowing could be explained in terms of the 
time it takes to process the deviating information. Barcelo et al. (2006) 
related slowing after unexpected novel events to a task-switch cost. In the 
present context, a task-irrelevant oddball will not activate task processes 
related to the ‘oddball task’ (because no task is required on the oddball), so 
the RT increase will only reflect the switching process. For feedback stimuli 
this is different. An unexpected feedback signal that captures attention might 
also activate task processes in the sense that unexpected feedback carries an 
important learning signal. In other words, the larger slowing in Experiment 1 
could be caused by a larger orienting response as such, but also by additional 
feedback processing time. 
Although the data pattern does not fit typical cognitive control 
theories, the explanation in terms of feedback processing time could be 
incorporated in the framework of Holroyd and Coles (2002; Holroyd, 
Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005). These authors describe error monitoring in 
terms of adjustments after a deviation from expectancy. Although the 
original theory only implements various degrees of expectancy for an error, 
this could be extended to expectations for correct trials and one could argue 
that post-correct slowing in conditions where errors are the standard in 
principle fits the essence of the theory. This theory would be able to explain 
why post-error and post-correct slowing is larger than post-oddball slowing, 
but more flexibility would be required to explain why post-oddball slowing 
is observed in the first place.  
To conclude, the orienting account for post-error slowing captures 
electrophysiological and clinical data that were extremely challenging for 
cognitive control explanations. With at least part of post-error slowing being 
caused by the low frequency of errors and the orienting response this 
generates, we suggest that researchers and clinicians are careful in 
interpreting post-error slowing as a marker for cognitive control. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ORIENTING TO ERRORS WITH AND WITHOUT 
IMMEDIATE FEEDBACK
2
 
 
 
 
 
A slow-down in reaction time (RT) after committing an error is a 
well-known effect. Recently, Notebaert and colleagues (Notebaert et al., 
2009; Nunez Castellar et al., 2010) suggested that post-error slowing is a 
reaction to the infrequent nature of errors. After infrequent errors, post-
error slowing was observed but after infrequent correct trials, post-correct 
slowing was observed. These data were obtained in a paradigm with trial-
by-trial feedback. In this study we tested whether post-error slowing was 
similar with and without immediate feedback. We manipulated the overall 
accuracy parametrically per condition (50%, 70% and 90% accuracy) and 
predicted an increase in post-error slowing as the accuracy increased. This 
linear effect was observed with and without immediate feedback. The data 
are interpreted in terms of an orienting response towards unexpected events. 
  
                                                          
2
Houtman, F., Nùñez Castellar, E., & Notebaert, W. (2012). Orienting to 
errors with and without immediate feedback. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 24, 
278-285. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life’s ever-changing environment it is necessary to adapt 
our behaviour. This demanding task requires monitoring of internal and 
external feedback signals indicating suboptimal behaviour. Among these 
signals, the ones indicating erroneous responses should be considered as 
highly relevant. When performing an impossible action on your computer for 
instance, you will hear an annoying beep indicating an erroneous key-press. 
In other cases, there is no such external feedback and you have to rely on 
internal monitoring processes. For example, even without a computer sound 
you sometimes feel you hit the wrong key. In this paper, we focus on 
internal action monitoring and investigate whether behavioural changes after 
internally detected errors are comparable to externally motivated behavioural 
changes. 
Behavioural adjustment after error detection is a well-described 
phenomenon. Usually reaction times (RTs) after incorrect responses are 
longer than after correct responses. This slow-down in performance was 
initially explained as a behavioural adjustment in order to prevent further 
errors. The conflict monitoring theory by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
and Cohen (2001) further specified that an erroneous trial is detected by the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which increases cognitive control, in this 
particular case, by increasing the response threshold. These cognitive 
explanations predict post-error slowing in combination with increased 
accuracy after an error. Although this pattern has been observed on some 
occasions (e.g., Laming, 1968), post-error slowing has also been observed in 
combination with post-error accuracy decrease (e.g., Fiehler, Ullsperger, & 
von Cramon, 2005). 
A recent account explains post-error slowing as an orienting 
response towards surprising events (Notebaert et al., 2009). This attention 
shift away from the task results in a RT increase and possibly an error rate 
increase. Notebaert et al. demonstrated this in a four-choice colour 
discrimination task. When, like in most RT experiments, correct responses 
outnumbered erroneous responses, post-error slowing was observed. 
However, when the majority of the trials were incorrect, post-correct 
slowing was observed, indicating that slowing occurs after infrequent events 
irrespective of the accuracy. Notebaert et al. also demonstrated slower RTs 
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following infrequent irrelevant signals (see also Barcelo, Escera, Corral, & 
Perianez, 2006). The influence of expectancies was further supported by the 
results of a recent event-related potential (ERP) study where it was also 
demonstrated that the feedback-related P3, a component likely associated 
with attentional orienting, predicted the slowing on the following trial 
(Núñez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). Crucially, in both 
experiments (Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010) feedback 
was provided after every response. Consequently, it was impossible to 
determine whether slowing after infrequent events was triggered by the 
unexpected action outcome or by the unexpected feedback signal.  
Post-error slowing has also been observed in studies without 
immediate feedback (e.g., Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 
2001; Allain, Burle, Hasbroucq, & Vidal, 2009). In studies where no 
immediate trial-by-trial feedback is delivered, the orienting account perhaps 
loses some face validity. Feedback signals are usually designed to minimize 
the chance that a participant or operator of a machine would miss it. 
Therefore it is not surprising that these, usually infrequent, events capture 
one’s attention and delay subsequent stimulus processing. When there is no 
feedback and a participant or operator has to rely on internal monitoring, the 
signal that should capture one’s attention is an internal mismatch signal. 
Although this is perhaps less salient than external feedback signals, this 
internal feedback signal provides us with the same important information. 
Consequently, the orienting account would predict similar slowing after 
internally detected errors. If the orienting account would be limited to 
explaining data patterns with immediate feedback, this would seriously limit 
the impact of this theoretical account. 
Because there are reasons to assume that external feedback signals 
differ from internal feedback signals in saliency and hence attention-
capturing properties, we investigated post-error slowing with and without 
immediate feedback. One group received feedback after every response, 
whereas the other group only received feedback after every fiftieth trial. In 
order to evaluate the orienting response to internally and externally detected 
errors, we created three accuracy conditions: 50% accurate, 70% accurate 
and 90% accurate. Based on the orienting account, we predicted an increase 
in post-error slowing as errors decrease. The main question is whether we 
can also observe this pattern in conditions without external feedback.  
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In order to obtain these accuracies we used the same adaptive 
programme as used in Notebaert et al. (2009) and Núñez Castellar et al. 
(2010). This programme keeps track of the performance and adjusts the 
stimulus discriminability when performance is too high or too low. Different 
from previous studies using this adaptive procedure, we only adjusted the 
stimulus discriminability in the beginning of the experiment. This allowed us 
to measure post-error accuracy changes, as the constant adjustment in 
previous studies made post-error accuracy measurements difficult to 
interpret. Contrary to the conflict monitoring theory, the orienting account 
does not predict a post-error accuracy increase. On the contrary, the account 
predicts a higher error rate after unexpected errors than after correct trials. 
When attention is drawn away from the task by an error, the obligatory 
shifting back to the task could result in more errors on top of a RT increase. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Thirty-two students (21 females, average age of 20 years and 6 
months) of Ghent University participated based on their written informed 
consent with approval of the local ethical committee and according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki. They all received course credits. 
APPARATUS AND STIMULI  
Participants had to react to the colour of a centrally presented 
square. These squares, with a size of 0.4° by 0.4°, were presented on a white 
background. Colours are described according to the HSV colour model with 
three parameters: hue (0°-360°), saturation (0%-100%) and value or 
brightness (0%-100%). The four colours that were used in the practice trials 
were yellow (60°, 100%, 90%), blue (240°, 100%, 90%), red (20°, 100%, 
90%) and green (120°, 100%, 90%). Participants responded to each of the 
colours with one of the four buttons on a Cedrus response box, with left and 
right index and middle fingers. Four different colour-to-button mapping 
rules were used. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of them. 
The participants were tested on a Pentium IV personal computer with a 17-
inch colour monitor running Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). 
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DESIGN 
Participants were asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible 
to the colour of the square. There were two within-subject factors and two 
between-subject factors. The first within-subject factor was the accuracy of 
the previous trial (correct or incorrect) and the second one was the accuracy 
condition (50, 70 or 90% accuracy). The first between-subject factor was the 
order of the accuracy conditions (50%-70%-90% or 90%-70%-50%) and the 
second between-subject factor indicated whether the participant received 
feedback after every trial (feedback condition) or only after every fiftieth 
trial (from now on called the no-feedback condition).  
PROCEDURE 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the feedback 
condition, the other half to the no-feedback condition. Participants entered a 
quiet room and sat in front of a computer and a response box. Instructions 
appeared on the screen and were supported orally by the experimenter. There 
were two practice blocks and three experimental blocks. The practice blocks 
were the same in both the feedback and no-feedback condition. The first 
practice block consisted of 30 trials without a response deadline. Each trial 
began with a central fixation cross (500 ms) followed by a stimulus which 
was presented until a button on the response box was pressed. Immediately 
after pressing the button the feedback signal appeared on the screen (J for 
correct, F for incorrect, corresponding to the words ‘juist’ and ‘fout’ in 
Dutch). This feedback signal was presented for 500 ms, followed by a blank 
screen for 100 ms, resulting in a total intertrial interval of 600 ms. In the 
second practice block, 100 trials were presented with a response deadline of 
1000 ms. A feedback signal was presented (T, for too slow, ‘te traag’ in 
Dutch) when the participant did not respond during that interval.  
This block was followed by three experimental blocks of 500 trials 
(200 adaptation trials and 300 experimental trials) each with a short break 
after every 125 trials. The three blocks corresponded to the frequency 
manipulation. Only the experimental trials of each block were analyzed. 
Every participant ran through the 50%, 70% and 90% accuracy conditions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two orders of the 
frequency manipulation. The initial colour brightness was set at 70%, in the 
50% condition, at 80%, in the 70% condition and at 90%, in the 90% 
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condition. Participants in the feedback condition got the same kind of trials 
as in the second block of the practice trials. In the no-feedback condition 
new instructions were presented on the screen. Instead of feedback a blank 
screen was presented for 600 ms. After every fiftieth trial the participants 
received feedback as follows: “xx% correct trials”.  
In the first 200 trials of each block an adaptive program was used in 
order to know the brightness that was needed to get a specified amount of 
correct trials in each block (50, 70, or 90%). The adaptive program 
calculated on every trial the accuracy of the past 20 trials. The brightness of 
the colours changed when the accuracy deviated from the specified level. 
For example in the 50% accuracy condition, when more than 10 errors were 
made in the previous 20 trials the brightness increased. This made the task 
easier. But when fewer than 10 errors were made the brightness decreased. 
After those 200 adaptation trials, the brightness stayed the same and was 
calculated as the average of the brightness of the last 100 trials. After that, 
300 experimental trials were presented. The only difference with the 
adaptation trials was that the stimuli had a fixed brightness. 
RESULTS 
All trials in the practice blocks and the adaptation blocks were 
excluded from the analysis. Also the trials with RTs faster than 200 ms and 
RTs exceeding the response deadline and the immediately following trials 
were excluded. In total 10.60% of the experimental trials were deleted. Both 
for correct RTs and error proportions a 3 (accuracy conditions) by 2 
(accuracy on the previous trial) by 2 (feedback group or no-feedback group) 
by 2 (order of the accuracy conditions) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted. The order in which the conditions were administered did not 
yield significant effects; therefore we removed this factor from the presented 
results. The adaptation procedure worked well in the 90% condition with 
92.3% accuracy, but a small deviation was observed in the 50% condition 
and the 70% condition with 56.5% and 83.8% accuracy. 
REACTION TIMES 
 In correct RTs, there was a main effect of accuracy condition (50%, 
70% or 90%), F(2,56) = 10.96, p < 0.001. Reaction times were fastest in the 
90% accuracy condition (M = 547.73, SD = 8.88) and there was almost no 
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difference between the 50% and the 70% accuracy condition (50: M = 
587.01, SD = 12.34; 70: M = 587.63, SD = 9.19). This effect did not interact 
with the feedback condition (F(2, 56) < 1, ns). 
There was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 28) = 5.05, p < 0.05 , as 
RTs were faster when immediate feedback was provided (feedback: M = 
554.57, SD = 12.32; no-feedback: M = 593.72, SD = 12.32). 
There was an overall post-error slowing effect, F(1,28) = 8.20, p < 
0.01, which interacted with accuracy condition, F(2,56) = 5.44, p < 0.01. In 
the 90% accuracy condition we observed post-error slowing (M = 30.24, SD 
= 51.23; t(31) = 3.34, p < 0.05), as well as in the 70% accuracy condition 
(M = 13.43, SD = 34.46; t(31) = 2.21, p < 0.05). No effect was found in the 
50% accuracy condition (M = -1.90, SD = 33.61; t(31) < 1, ns). Most 
importantly, post-error slowing did not interact with feedback condition 
(F(1, 28) < 1, ns), and also the three-way interaction was not significant 
(F(2, 56) < 1, ns) (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Correct reaction times for trials following correct trials (after 
correct) and trials following incorrect trials (after error) in the three accuracy 
conditions (50%, 70% and 90% accuracy). Upper graph: results for the group 
that received immediate feedback. Lower graph: results for the group that did 
not receive immediate feedback. Vertical bars indicate two standard errors. 
 
To specifically test increased slowing as a function of accuracy, we 
tested the linear increase in slowing as accuracy increased. For every 
participant the post-error slowing effect was calculated per condition and a 
regression coefficient was calculated. Because we predicted that the 
regression coefficients would be larger than zero we used a one tailed t-test 
to test this (see Lorch & Myers, 1990). As predicted, the regression 
coefficients were larger than zero (M = 80.35, SD = 149.01, t(31) = 3.05, p 
< 0.01). A two sample t-test showed that the regression coefficients of both 
groups (feedback condition and no-feedback condition) did not differ from 
one another (t(30) < 1, ns). 
ERROR PROPORTIONS 
There was an obvious main effect of accuracy condition, F(2, 56) = 
104.94, p < 0.001. This effect did not interact with the feedback condition 
(F(2, 56) = 1.61, p = 0.21) and there was no main effect of feedback for the 
error proportions, F(1, 28) < 1, ns. 
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Most interesting, there was post-error accuracy decrease, F(2, 28) = 
21.22, p < 0.001, with a higher error proportion after errors (M = 24.6%, SD 
= 1.1) than after correct trials (M = 20.4%, SD = 1.0) . No interaction with 
the feedback condition was observed (F(1, 28) < 1, ns).The interaction 
between accuracy on the previous trial and accuracy condition, F(2, 56) = 
9.910, p < 0.001, indicates differences in the size of the post-error accuracy 
decrease. In the 50% accuracy condition post-error accuracy decrease was 
significant while in the 70% condition this effect was marginally significant 
and not significant in 90% condition (50%: M = 8.87, SD = 8.12, t(31) = 
6.18, p < 0.001; 70%: M = 2.60, SD = 8.05, t(31) = 1.83, p = 0.078; 90%: M 
= 1.04, SD = 7.53, t(31) = 0.78, p = 0.44). There was no interaction with the 
feedback condition (F(2, 56) = 1.513, p = 0.223), as is shown in Figure 2. In 
order to gain insight in the unpredicted interaction between post-error 
accuracy changes and accuracy condition we performed an extra analysis. 
We suspected that the accuracy decrease after errors was affected by the 
overall error proportions, in the sense that one can expect more double errors 
in the 50% accuracy condition than in the 70% or 90% accuracy condition. 
We therefore analysed the error proportion of trials preceding an error in the 
three different conditions and observed that the error proportions of trials 
preceding an error differed for the three accuracy conditions, F(2, 56) = 
10.62, p < 0.001. The accuracy difference preceding an error or a correct 
trial was significant in the 50% accuracy condition while this effect was 
marginally significant in the 70% condition and not significant in 90% 
condition. This post-hoc analysis clearly indicated that post-error accuracy 
differences over accuracy conditions are not related to post-error adjustments 
as exactly the same pattern was observed before the actual error. This 
suggests that the post-error accuracy decrease differences over accuracy 
conditions reflect the overall probabilities of error commission. 
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Figure 2. Proportion errors following correct trials (after correct) and 
following incorrect trials (after error) in the three accuracy conditions (50%, 
70% and 90% accuracy). Upper graph: results for the group that received 
immediate feedback. Lower graph: results for the group that did not receive 
immediate feedback. Vertical bars indicate two standard errors. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study aimed to further investigate the orienting account 
(Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010). More precisely, we 
wanted to examine the effect of external feedback on post-error 
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performance. This was done by testing a group that received external 
feedback and a group that had to rely on internal monitoring. Additionally, 
we manipulated error frequency parametrically in order to test predictions 
made by the orienting account.  
As predicted by the orienting account, the size of the post-error 
slowing depends on the error frequency, replicating previous studies 
(Notebaert et al., 2009; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010). When only few errors 
are made, the orienting response is large because infrequent errors elicit a 
large surprise effect. In that case, attention is distracted from the task and 
RTs to the following stimulus are delayed. When errors become more 
frequent, they become less surprising or unexpected and they receive less 
attention resulting in better performance on the following trial. The linear 
increase in post-error slowing from 50% over 70% to 90% nicely 
demonstrates the effect of error frequency and surprise.  
Most importantly, this linear increase was essentially the same in the 
condition without immediate feedback. This suggests, at least within the 
framework of the orienting account, that orienting to internally detected 
errors and externally indicated errors is similar. One possible interpretation 
for this finding is that the orienting response is triggered by the internal error 
signal, even in the condition with feedback. This interpretation can be 
supported by the findings of a recent study showing that if, occasionally, 
false error feedback is delivered, post-error slowing is present only after 
incorrect responses but not after correct responses (de Bruijn, Mars, & 
Hulstijn, 2004). Likewise, in a recent study where errors were inserted 
during type writing, it was found that although participants in general 
accepted the authorship for inserted errors, post-error slowing was found 
only following actual committed errors but not after inserted errors (Logan 
& Crump, 2010). These studies suggest that internal error detection is more 
important than feedback. On the other hand, we have already described 
slowing after completely irrelevant but infrequent feedback signals and after 
infrequent correct feedback (Notebaert et al., 2009). Consequently, it appears 
that slowing can occur following internal and external infrequent signals. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that feedback was manipulated 
between subjects. It should be investigated whether these conclusions remain 
the same when feedback is manipulated within subjects. 
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Interestingly, ERP studies have described two components locked to 
either the onset of error responses or to the onset of error feedback: the error 
positivity (Pe) and the P3, respectively. Recent findings suggest that the Pe 
can be considered as a P3-like component associated with the motivational 
significance of an error (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; 
Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009). Given that the P3 component has 
been consistently linked to the allocation of attention, we think that both 
components, Pe and P3, reflect attentional capture by errors as infrequent 
events. In fact, several studies have found a close relationship between the 
slowing following an error and the amplitude of the Pe (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2001; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003). Similarly, a recent ERP 
study has shown that when feedback is presented after every response, the 
P3 amplitude is correlated with the slowing in the subsequent trial (Núñez 
Castellar et al., 2010). In the near future we will further investigate this idea 
by examining the neural correlates of the slowing when feedback is 
delivered versus when it is not, and test experimentally whether we can find 
evidence for the uniformity of the Pe and the P3 components in relation to 
the slowing. 
Recent fMRI studies (King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; 
Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011) that 
investigated the relation between posterior medial frontal cortex activity and 
post-error behaviour observed a relationship between post-error slowing and 
decreased motor activation. Although this could be interpreted in terms of a 
motor inhibition account (Danielmeier et al.), it is also possible that the 
distraction on the basis of the infrequent error results in decreased motor 
activation. Considered this way, both post-error slowing and decreased 
motor activation could be the result of the orienting. Another goal of this 
study was to investigate possible changes in accuracy after errors. In the 
50% accuracy condition a significantly higher chance of committing an error 
after an error compared to after a correct response was found. This post-error 
accuracy decrease was not observed in the 70% and the 90% condition. An 
additional analysis, however, indicated that this interaction was also 
observed prior to the error. This indicates that this interaction was caused by 
the overall likelihood of double errors which is much higher in the 50% 
condition. Importantly, while this analysis indicates that comparing the 
accuracy effects over conditions should be avoided, the overall pattern 
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suggests that there is absolutely no support for an accuracy increase after 
errors. These findings are in line with several studies that also failed to find a 
post-error accuracy increase (Hajcak et al., 2003). 
The increase in post-error slowing with increasing accuracy was 
explicitly predicted by the orienting account but also the model of Holroyd 
and Coles (2002; Holroyd, Yeung, Coles, & Cohen, 2005) can capture these 
data. In conditions where errors are infrequent, the learning signal derived 
from infrequent errors will be larger and slowing could be larger. However, 
when post-error slowing is the result from learning processes one would 
expect reduced error rates after errors, which is not observed. On the other 
hand, we would like to argue that with longer intertrial intervals, the 
orienting response is indeed the first step in a learning processes aimed at 
improving performance. Jentzsch and Dudschig (2009) for instance, 
demonstrated that with short intervals slowing was accompanied with 
accuracy decrease which was not observed with longer intervals. In order to 
investigate a possible integration of the orienting account and Holroyd and 
Coles’ model, more empirical work is necessary.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PE AS AN INDEX OF INTERNAL ORIENTING TO 
ERRORS
3
 
 
 
Understanding the link between neural correlates of error 
commission and behavioural adjustments afterwards is central for 
understanding error monitoring. In previous studies, we demonstrated that 
post-error slowing (PES) was modulated by participants’ error frequency 
with more PES when errors were less frequent (Houtman, Nùñez-Castellar, 
& Notebaert, 2012). We observed PES when errors were unexpected and we 
even observed post-correct slowing when correct responses were unexpected 
(Notebaert et al, 2009). In an EEG study, we replicated this finding and 
showed that the P3 followed this pattern, but the ERN and the FRN did not, 
which was interpreted in terms of orienting towards unexpected errors 
(Nùñez-Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). In this study we 
investigated the influence of error frequency after errors without immediate 
feedback both on brain and behaviour. Error frequency was manipulated by 
creating an easy and a difficult version of a flanker task. Surprisingly, we 
did not find a difference in PES between both conditions. The PE and the 
ERN, however, were larger in the easy condition where errors were more 
infrequent, but only the PE effect was specifically related to the error rate 
difference between both conditions. Additionally, across participants, PES 
correlated with the amplitude of the PE in the difficult condition. The results 
are interpreted in favour of the orienting account for PES and in terms of a 
functional similarity between the P3 when feedback is presented and the PE 
when no performance feedback is presented. 
                                                          
3
Houtman, F., Van der Borght, L., & Notebaert, W. The PE as an index of 
internal orienting to errors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to behave adaptively to the requirements of the environment 
it is necessary to monitor external and internal signals that point out the need 
for adjustment. In this study, we investigate the relation between neural 
correlates of such signals and the behavioural consequences of the actual 
adjustment. In a previous study, we demonstrated that feedback-related P3 
activity correlated with subsequent post-error slowing (PES) (Nùñez-
Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010). In this study, no feedback is 
presented and we investigate the relationship between neural correlates of 
internal error detection and subsequent reaction times. 
Although many signals indicate that performance is suboptimal and 
cognitive adjustments are required, the detection of an error is probably the 
most important signal. According to many, PES (slower RTs after errors 
than after correct trials) is the prototypical result of cognitive adaptation after 
errors. In the conflict monitoring theory (CMT) (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001), an error is detected as co-activation of two or more 
responses and leads to increased cognitive control. Increasing cognitive 
control is done by heightening the response threshold. Similarly, the 
inhibition account (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Marco-Pallares, Camara, & Münte, 
2008), suggests that error commission leads to selective suppression or 
inhibition of motor processes.  
In scalp-recorded EEG, response-locked error-related activity is 
usual found as two subsequent waves. First there is a negative voltage 
deflection in the event-related brain potential peaking between 0 en 100ms 
after the erroneous response and thought to be generated by the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Dikman & 
Allen, 2000; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000) usually referred to as the 
error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990) or 
the error negativity (NE; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 
1991). This is followed by a slow positive wave with maximum amplitude 
between 200 and 400 ms and a more diffuse scalp distribution (Falkenstein, 
et al., 1991), which is referred to as the PE. The ERN/NE was originally 
described as a mismatch signal when the representation of the desired 
response did not match with the representation of the actual response. 
Whereas the PE was attributed to additional processes like for example error 
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recognition (Falkenstein et al, 1991; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, 
Band, & Kok, 2001). For the remainder of the paper we will use the term 
ERN to refer to the ERN/ NE. 
The PE has been related to the P3, a positive stimulus-locked slow 
wave appearing between 200 and 400 ms after stimulus onset (Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). The P3 has generally been associated with the 
processing of unexpected events (Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965; for a 
review, see Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). Later on, the P3 has 
been subdivided into two subcomponents, namely the P3a and the P3b. 
Whereas the P3a is more sensitive to the novelty of events (Friedman, 
Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) the P3b is ought to be sensitive to the amount of 
attentional resources allocated to a stimulus (Polich, 2007). In a study of 
Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, and Wijnen (2009) the relation between and P3 
was investigated. The amplitude of the PE in a Simon task covaried with the 
effect of a manipulation known to influence stimulus saliency as reflected in 
the P3. Davies, Segalowitz, Dywan, and Pailing (2001) also reported a 
correlation between the size of the stimulus-locked P3 and the response-
locked PE in a Flanker task. It seems that the PE is a P3-like reaction to the 
motivational and salient nature most errors have.  
In the present paper, we are especially interested in the relation 
between these brain components and behaviour. Nùñez-Castellar and 
colleagues (2010) reported that the amplitude of the feedback-locked P3 
correlated with the size of the post-error and the post-correct slowing, unlike 
the amplitudes of the ERN and the FRN (i.e. a feedback-locked ERN-like 
brain wave). In the condition with 75% correct trials, PES was observed and 
the amplitude of the P3 was larger after error feedback than after correct 
feedback. In the condition with 35% correct trials the reverse was found: 
post-correct slowing was observed and P3 amplitude was higher for 
unexpected correct trials. These results are explained with the orienting 
account that explains PES in terms of the orienting to unexpected events 
(Notebaert et al., 2009; Houtman, Nùñez-Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012). 
In experiments without immediate feedback, the results are less 
clear. Some studies report an association between the amplitude of the ERN 
and PES (Hewig, Coles, Trippe, Hecht, & Miltner, 2011; Compton et al., 
2008, Debener et al., 2005), whereas other studies fail to find this (Endrass, 
Reuter, & Kathmann, 2007; Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Hajcak, McDonald, 
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& Simons, 2003). Furthermore, the ERN has also been reported in the 
absence or reduction of PES (Mathalon, Faustman, & Ford, 2002; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Wiersema, van der Meere, & Roeyers, 2005). The 
PE on the other hand, seems to be more related to behavioural measures 
associated with error monitoring. In a study where unperceived errors are not 
followed by PES (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001) also no PE is found. In one study 
PES correlates positively with PE amplitudes (Hajcak et al., 2003), whereas 
it does not correlate with the number of errors that are made.  
In this experiment we further investigated the relation between 
neural correlates of internal error detection (without feedback) and 
behavioural adjustments. Recently, we demonstrated that also without 
feedback, error frequency determines the size of PES (Houtman et al., 2012). 
Therefore, we applied a similar logic as Nùñez-Castellar et al. and 
manipulated task difficulty in order to influence error frequency. Moreover, 
we predicted higher PES in the easy condition than the difficult condition. 
Given the presumed relation between PE and P3, we predict an increased PE 
in the easy condition that should directly be related to the error-rate 
difference between both conditions. Because we can also expect 
considerable across-participant variability in error rates within conditions, 
we will also correlate individual accuracy rates, PES indices, ERN and PE. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Sixteen participants participated in the experiment. Every participant 
gave written informed consent. The study was approved by the ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent 
University. They all had normal or corrected to normal vision and were 
neurologically and psychiatrically healthy. Participants were paid 15€ per 
hour. 
PROCEDURE 
The participants were seated in a comfortable armchair in a light-
dimmed and sound-attenuated room. They were tested on a Pentium ІV 
personal computer with a 17-inch monitor running Tscope (Steven, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen & Vandierendonck, 2006). Participants had to press 
two buttons on a Cedrus response box to give a manual response with the 
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left and right index fingers. The classical flanker task was modified in order 
to create two conditions that differed in difficulty. There were four blocks in 
the experiment, two easy blocks and two difficult blocks. Half of the 
participants started with an easy block, followed by a difficult, an easy and 
again a difficult block. In the other half of the group this order was reversed. 
The response mapping was randomly picked in each block, with the 
restriction that that particular response mapping was not used in an earlier 
block for that particular participant. In the easy condition the stimulus-
response mapping was 2:1, whereas in the difficult condition the stimulus-
response mapping was 4:1. In each of the blocks 512 trials were presented. 
Each block started with the presentation of the response mapping. After 
every 128
th
 trial there was a break. During the self-paced break feedback 
about the past 128 trials was presented in the form of the percentage correct 
responses and the percentage too slow responses. As a reminder the response 
mapping of the current block was shown again. 
 In the easy condition there were four possible stimuli, namely: {, }, 
[ and ]. The curly brackets were mapped on one response button and the 
blocked brackets on the other response button. In each trial one target 
stimulus flanked by four, two on each side, stimuli were presented. Fifty 
percent of the trials were congruent trials; in this case all 5 presented stimuli 
were the same. And 50% of the trials were incongruent trials; in that case the 
target and the flanker stimuli were different. There was one restriction; 
flanking stimuli were always stimuli that needed another response. This 
means that there were only response-incongruent trials and no stimulus-
incongruent trials. For example, when participants had to respond to curly 
brackets by pressing the right button and to blocked brackets by pressing the 
left button, an incongruent trial could look like this {{]{{ but never like this 
{{}{{. In the difficult condition there were 8 possible stimuli, namely {, }, [, 
], (, ), | and ¦. Four stimuli were mapped on the left response button and four 
on the right response button. Again there were no stimulus-incongruent 
stimuli, but only incongruent stimuli at response level.  
The stimulus was presented centrally on a blank screen for 145 ms 
or until a response button was pressed. Participants had a maximum response 
time of 800 ms. After the response was given or when the response deadline 
was reached there was an inter trial interval of 1100 ms. During the inter trial 
interval the screen was blank. 
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ELECTROPHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS  
EEG data were recorded using the BioSemi ActiveTwo system 
(Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). With active scalp electrodes 64 
channels of EEG data (10–20 system positions) were recorded at a rate of 
1024 Hz per channel (filters: DC to 268 Hz, 3 dB/octave). The vertical 
electrooculogram (VEOG) was recorded by means of a single electrode 
placed just below the left eye. The horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) was 
measured with two electrodes positioned on the two outer canthi. Off-line, 
the data were referenced to the right mastoid.  
DATA ANALYSIS 
ERPs  
The ERP analyses were done in Matlab (www.mathworks.com) 
with the academic freeware toolboxes EEGLAB 
(http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab) and ERPLAB (http://erpinfo.org/erplab). 
The continuous EEG signal was filtered off-line with a high-pass filter of 
0.16 Hz and down-sampled to 256 Hz. Independent component analysis 
(ICA) was conducted to identify and remove stereotypical eye blink 
components. 
The EEG was segmented into condition-related epochs time-locked 
to the response, starting from 300 ms before until 1400 ms after the 
response. Then, averages for error and correct responses were derived 
separately. The resulting ERPs were baseline-corrected using the 300 ms 
pre-stimulus window. In line with previous investigations (e.g., Olvet & 
Hajcak, 2009), the ERN was measured as the mean amplitude in a time-
window between 0 and 50 ms after the incorrect response at electrode FCz. 
For the CRN, we calculated the amplitude in the same time-window 
following on correct responses. For the PE analysis the mean amplitudes in 
the time-window of 200ms to 400ms after errors and correct responses at 
electrode Pz were calculated separately.  
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RESULTS 
BEHAVIOURAL DATA 
Manipulation check 
In order to verify that the manipulation lead to different levels of 
difficulty measured in error rates a paired-sample t-test was done on the 
error rates in the easy condition and in the difficult condition. Participants 
made more errors (M = 29%) in the difficult condition than in the easy 
condition (M = 20%), t(15) = 5.227, p < .001. Overall, reaction times were 
faster in the easy condition (M = 453 ms, SD = 11) than in the difficult 
condition (M = 500 ms, SD = 15), F(1, 15) = 52.749, p < .001. Erroneous 
responses (M = 469 ms, SD = 14) were faster than correct responses (M = 
483 ms, SD = 12), F(1, 15) = 11.273, p < .01. There was no interaction effect 
of condition and accuracy, F < 1. This means that the errors in both 
conditions were comparable, at least in terms of response speed. 
 
Figure 1. Post-error and post-correct reaction times. Generally, 
responses are slower in the difficult condition than in the easy condition. The 
post-error slowing effect, however, is the same in both conditions. 
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Post-error adjustments.  
In order to test for post-error slowing, both error rates and correct 
reaction times were analysed with rm ANOVAs. The within-subject factors 
were condition and previous accuracy. In the correct reaction times an 
overall effect of PES was found, F(1, 15) = 9.934, p < .01. Responses after 
making an error were slower (M = 492 ms, SD = 12) than after a correct 
response (M = 480 ms, SD = 12). Contrary to our expectations (see Figure 
1), there was no modulation of the PES effect by the difficulty manipulation, 
F < 1. As was already shown in the previous analysis, correct reaction times 
were faster in the easy condition (M = 463 ms, SD = 10) than in the difficult 
condition (M = 509 ms, SD = 14), F(1, 15) = 41.747, p < .001. In the error 
rates analysis no effect of the accuracy of the previous trial or an interaction 
effect was found, respectively F(1, 15) = 1.445, p = .248 and F < 1. As 
expected, error rates in the easy condition were lower than in the difficult 
condition, F(1, 15) = 25.712, p < .001.  
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Figure 2. Grand average ERP waveforms at FCz (top figure) and Pz (bottom 
figure) as a function of accuracy of the response and difficulty condition. Both the ERN 
and the PE are larger in the easy condition compared to in the difficult condition 
ERPS 
PE  
The mean amplitudes at Pz between 200ms and 400ms after 
response per condition and per accuracy were subjected to an rm ANOVA. 
There was no main effect of condition, F < 1. The significant effect of the 
accuracy, F(1, 15) = 35.324, p < .001, shows the PE because the mean 
amplitude after an error was more positive (M = 3.198, SD = 0.7) than after a 
correct response (M = -0.159, SD = 0.8). Most importantly, there was an 
interaction effect of condition and accuracy, F(1, 15) = 7.289, p < .02. As 
can be seen on Figure 2, the PE was larger in the easy condition (error 
related: M = 3.578, SD = 0.7 vs. correct related: M = -0.485, SD = 0.8) than 
in the difficult condition (error related: M = 2.818, SD = 0.8 vs. correct 
related: M = 0.166, SD = 0.8). In order to verify whether the difference 
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between the easy PE and the difficult PE was linked to the difference in error 
rates, we performed a correlation analysis between participants’ difference in 
error rates between conditions and participants’ difference in PE between 
conditions. This correlation revealed that the difference in PE was indeed tied 
to differences in error rates, r(16) = -.608, p = .013, see Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Scatter plots of the differences in error rates between both 
conditions and the differences in PE (on the left) and the differences in ERN 
effect (on the right). 
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ERN 
A 2 (condition: easy, difficult) by 2 (accuracy: correct, error) rm 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of accuracy, F(1, 15) = 32.739, p < .001. 
The mean amplitudes were more negative for errors (M = -1.786, SD = 0.6) 
than for correct responses (M = 0.658, SD = 0.6). There was also a 
significant interaction between the condition and the accuracy of the 
response, F(1, 15) = 13.913, p < .01. The difference between the ERN and 
the CRN was much larger in the easy condition (ERN: M = -2.155, SD = 0.5 
vs. CRN: M = 1.151, SD = 0.7) than in the difficult condition (ERN: M = -
1.417, SD = 0.6 vs. CRN: M = 0.164, SD = 0.5), as can be seen on Figure 4. 
There was no main effect of condition, F < 1. In order to verify whether this 
difference was associated with the difference in terms of error rates we 
correlated participants’ difference score in terms of error rates and difference 
score in terms of ERN effect (ERN-CRN). The scatter plot is presented in 
Figure 3. This analysis revealed a marginally significant correlation, r(16) = 
.427, p = .099, not allowing strong conclusions.  
 
Figure 4. Voltage scalp maps show activation evoked by making an 
error as the difference between making an error minus responding correctly at 
different time intervals after response. A larger ERN is shown 0-50 ms after 
response in the easy condition than in the difficult condition. The same was 
found for the PE in the 200-400 ms interval. 
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The data show that while the ERN and the PE are influenced by our 
difficulty manipulation, PES is not. However, only for the PE, we have 
support for the claim that PE differences are really linked to differences in 
error frequencies. Finally, we tested whether error frequency within each 
condition has an effect on PES and neural indices of error monitoring. 
Again, we calculated the ERN by subtracting the mean amplitudes on correct 
trials from the mean amplitudes on error trials. The same procedure was 
done to calculate the PE. Importantly, within conditions, PES was influenced 
by error frequency, see Figure 5. In the difficult condition a negative 
correlation between PES and the mean error rates was found, r(16) = -.546, p 
= .029. In the easy condition there was a marginal correlation, r(16) = -.469, 
p = .067. As predicted by the orienting account, the more errors that 
participants make, the smaller their PES becomes.  
 
Figure 5. The scatter plot of mean error rates and the difference 
between correct RTs after correct response and after errors (PES) both for the 
easy and for the difficult condition. Making more errors goes together with a 
smaller PES effect, in both conditions. 
Mean error rate within conditions also influenced the size of the 
ERN effect. The size of the ERN in the hard condition correlated positively 
with the percentage errors in that condition, r(16) = .754, p < .01. This 
means that the more errors that were made, the smaller the ERN effect 
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became. In the easy condition there was a marginal significant correlation, 
r(16) = .458, p = .074. 
The mean error rates in the easy condition correlated negatively with 
PE, r(16) = -.585, p = .017. In other words, participants with higher error 
rates had a lower PE. The same negative correlation was found in the 
difficult condition, r(16) = -.863, p < .001.  
Most interestingly, PES correlated with the PE, at least in the hard 
condition, r(16) = .571, p = .021. Participants that show a large PE also have 
increased PES, as can be seen in Figure 6. In the easy condition PES did not 
correlate with the PE, r(16) = .138, p = .610. PES did not correlate with the 
ERN, not in the easy condition, r(16) = -.386 , p = .140, nor in the hard 
condition, r(16) = -.253 , p = .345.  
 
Figure 6. PES correlates only in the difficult condition with the 
amplitudes of the PE. 
DISCUSSION 
In this ERP-study, task difficulty was manipulated in order to 
investigate post-error behavioural adjustments and neural correlates of error 
processing. The difficulty manipulation was established by creating a 
condition with a 2:1 stimulus response mapping and a more difficult 
condition with a 4:1 stimulus response mapping. More errors were made in 
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the difficult condition than in the easy condition, although this effect was not 
large (on average 9% more errors in difficult condition).  
Unexpectedly, PES did not depend on error frequency, at least not 
on group level. The orienting account would predict that overall PES is 
smaller in the difficult condition than in the easy condition because there is a 
significant difference in error frequency between both conditions (21% in 
the easy condition vs. 30% in the difficult condition). It is possible that the 
difference of 9% errors between both conditions was not sufficiently large to 
impact PES on a group level. In previous studies where we also manipulated 
error frequency we consistently observed an effect on PES. In conditions 
where errors outnumbered correct response, post-correct slowing was found 
(Notebaert et al., 2009, Nùñez-Castellar et al., 2010, 2011). In a study where 
error frequency was manipulated in three conditions (50%, 30% and 10% 
errors) PES was largest in the 10% error conditions, smaller in the 30% 
condition and no PES effect was found in the 50% errors condition. 
Although the effect of the error frequency manipulation on PES was absent 
on group level, we did find an effect on the individual level. The correlation 
analyses showed that, in both conditions, participants with the highest error 
rate also showed the smallest PES. The same effect was reported in an article 
by an independent research group (Steinborn, Flehmig, Bratzke, & Schröter, 
2012). Although there was a rather small range in accuracy rates (94% to 
99%), also in that study high accuracy rates resulted in large PES.  
The difficulty manipulation did have an impact on the error-related 
ERP measures. Both the ERN and the PE were more pronounced in the easy 
condition than in the difficult condition. Interestingly, only the PE effect was 
directly related to the differences in error rates between both conditions. 
Within conditions, both neural indices were related to participants’ error 
rates, but only PE and PES correlated. 
Our results therefore add to the cumulative evidence that the P3 and 
the PE are neural correlates with very comparable functionalities. Both ERP 
measures covary with the saliency of an event. In the study of Nùñez-
Castellar et al. the P3 was largest after the least frequent feedback in a 
particular condition. Similarly, in our study the PE was largest in the 
condition with less error rates and largest for participants with the smallest 
error rate. Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, and Hohnsbein (2000) already 
suggested that the PE might reflect the subjective significance of an error. Or 
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as Falkenstein et al. (pp. 104) stated: “For subjects who commit errors often, 
an error has probably less subjective and emotional significance than for 
subjects who commit errors only rarely, which is reflected in a small 
amplitude of the PE”. They found that the PE was larger in a subgroup 
performing better (6% errors) than in the other subgroup (20% errors), there 
was however no difference in the amplitude of the ERN in both subgroups. 
This study was done with only 5 participants in each subgroup. By 
replicating this finding with a larger group and a within-subjects 
manipulation we provide further evidence that the PE is a neural correlate of 
the significance of an error. Studies arguing that the PE reflects the 
awareness of an error (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001) do not contradict our 
finding. The more significant an error is to you, the more aware you 
probably are that you made that error. It is important to remark that the 
relationship between PE and PES was only observed in the difficult 
condition. One of the reasons could be that PES is calculated more reliably 
when more errors occur, this is also suggested by that fact that the 
correlation between error rates and PES was significant in the difficult 
condition, and only marginally significant in the easy condition. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the restricted accuracy range in the easy 
condition makes it more difficult to find any reliable correlations within this 
condition. 
The relation between error frequency, ERN and PES is less 
straightforward. Although the ERN was larger in the condition with fewer 
errors, the difference scores between both conditions of these two measures 
were not directly correlated. On the other hand, within the difficult condition 
there was a correlation between error frequency and ERN. However, there 
was no correlation between ERN and PES. Consequently, it seems that also 
the ERN is linked to overall performance statistics but not directly to error 
frequency, and clearly not to PES. An explanation for our results is provided 
by the reinforcement theory of Holroyd and Coles (2002). Within this 
framework, the ERN is a reinforcement learning signal. Based on this theory 
one could argue that in the difficult condition the expectations about 
performance are lower and therefore the ERN is smaller. Note that the ERN 
is in fact the difference between the ERN and the CRN, and our study nicely 
demonstrates that when more errors are made, the ERN decreases while the 
CRN increases, resulting in a smaller (difference) ERN. This pattern of 
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results can also be interpreted in terms of the ERN as an index of cognitive 
conflict (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004; Cavanagh, 
Cohen, & Allen, 2009). In the easy condition correct trials presumably evoke 
less conflict because of the simple mapping rule resulting in fast RTs, low 
error rates and a small CRN. Errors in this condition, however, evoke more 
response conflict, and therefore an increased ERN effect, because there is 
more chance that both responses were simultaneously activated. Nùñez-
Castellar et al. also observed a modulation of the ERN when manipulating 
error frequency: only in the condition with more correct trials than errors, the 
ERN was observed, in the condition with more errors than correct trials, 
there was no ERN. In this study, the difficult condition was very difficult (in 
order to have a condition with more errors than correct trials). It is likely that 
in this condition, the response conflict was as large on correct trials as on 
incorrect trials, yielding no difference between the CRN and the ERN. 
However, just as in our study, there was no direct link between the ERN and 
PES.  
This is consistent with a study of Nieuwenhuis et al. where no 
difference in ERN between aware and unaware errors was observed, whereas 
there was a difference in PES and PE. This finding indicates that ERN does 
not depend on error awareness and presumably reflects the detection of 
response conflict or other indications of internal processing. Similar findings 
were reported in the study of Hajcak et al. (2003) where skin conductance 
(SCR) correlated with the PE and PES but not with the ERN. The increased 
SCR is one of the autonomic responses (others are pupil dilation and heart 
rate deceleration) known to occur during an orienting response. 
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Errors are typically followed by a series of behavioural changes. 
Although most of these changes are well understood, accuracy changes 
following errors are not. A new paradigm is presented where participants 
performed a flanker task followed by a rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) of numbers (1-9). In most trials, a letter was presented on three 
possible positions of the RSVP (1-3-6). This was done with and without 
immediate feedback on the flanker task. In both experiments participants had 
worse target detection after an error in the flanker task. These findings 
support non-functional accounts for error monitoring that predict decreased 
post-error performance (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 
2009; Notebaert et al., 2009). In a third experiment we tried to dissociate 
between a bottleneck and an orienting account and showed decreased target 
detection after irrelevant red signals, irrespective of frequency. This result is 
interpreted in support for the bottleneck account (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 
2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009). 
  
                                                          
4
Houtman, F. & Notebaert, W. Blinded by an Error. In Press in Cognition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several behavioural and neural correlates of error commission have 
been described in the literature. For instance, heart rate deceleration (Danev 
& de Winter, 1971), pupil dilation (Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & 
Dolan, 2005) and a larger skin-conductance response (O’Connell et al., 
2007) have been reported to follow an erroneous response. Event-related 
potential (ERP) studies on the other hand, demonstrate error-related 
negativity (ERN) peaking frontally within 50 to 200 ms after an error (for a 
recent review see Hajcak, 2012), followed by a more posterior error-related 
positivity that peaks between 200 and 400 ms after an error. In addition to 
measures taken at the time of error commission, behaviour after making an 
error has also been investigated thoroughly. Three hallmarks of behaviour 
following an error are post-error slowing, post-error reduction of 
interference and post-error improvement in accuracy (PIA). Post-error 
slowing (PES, e.g. Rabbitt, 1966; Laming, 1968; Debener et al., 2005) refers 
to the finding that people respond slower following an error than after a 
correct trial. PES has been shown to be reliable over periods ranging from 20 
minutes, a couple of weeks (Segalowitz et al., 2010) to several months 
(Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). The second behavioural post-error effect 
is observed in congruency tasks such as the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974), where participants have to categorize a centrally presented target that 
is flanked by stimuli associated either with the correct response (congruent) 
or the incorrect response (incongruent). In these tasks, it is observed that the 
interference effect, i.e. slower and less accurate responses to an incongruent 
stimulus compared to a congruent stimulus, is reduced after errors 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2002). This effect is known as post-error reduction of 
interference (PERI). Several studies indicate that PES and PERI are 
independent (although Carp and Compton, 2009 found a correlation) and are 
produced by different neuronal networks (De Bruijn, Hulstijn, Verkes, Ruigt, 
& Sabbe, 2004; Ridderinkhof, 2002; King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 
2010). The third behavioural finding is the observation that errors are 
followed by improved accuracy (e.g. Laming, 1968; Marco-Pallares, 
Camara, Munte, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008; Maier, Yeung, & Steinhauser, 
2011). This finding, however, is not universal as some studies reported no 
difference between post-error and post-correct accuracy (e.g. Hajcak, 
McDonald, & Simons, 2003; King et al., 2010) while others reported a 
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decline in accuracy directly after an error (e.g. Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; 
Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Steinborn, Flehmig, Bratzke, & Schröter, 
2012). PIA does not correlate with PERI (King et al., 2010) and also PES 
does not always correlate with PIA (Carp & Compton, 2009; King et al., 
2010; Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; 
Cohen, & van Gaal, 2012). Hajcak and colleagues (2003) did find a positive 
correlation between PES and PIA where greater PES resulted in improved 
post-error accuracy. Taken together, the behavioural findings concerning 
PIA are not unequivocal. As Danielmeier and Ullsperger mentioned in their 
review (2011), PIA research is highly influenced by overall accuracy rates in 
an experiment as chances of committing double errors are higher when more 
errors are made.  
Understanding post-error accuracy changes, however, is very 
important because it can be used to distinguish between functional and non-
functional theories for PES. Functional theories hold that error processing 
and subsequent adjustments are intended to improve performance on the 
following trial(s). In this light, PES is functional in the sense that it increases 
response caution. Perhaps the best-known example of a functional 
framework is the conflict monitoring theory, although this theory is even 
better known for conflict monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Within this framework, an 
error results in co-activation of two or more responses, which is recognized 
as conflict. Conflict detection increases cognitive control by increasing the 
response threshold resulting in slower and more accurate performance. 
Dutilh and colleagues (2012) recently provided support for increased 
response caution following errors in a lexical decision task, by means of 
diffusion modeling. The inhibition account (Ridderinkhof, 2002; Marco-
Pallares et al., 2008) has much in common with the conflict monitoring 
theory. It states that after error commission selective suppression or 
inhibition of response activation occurs. In support for this account, PES 
correlates with an increase in beta band power that is associated with motor 
inhibition processes (Marco-Pallares et al., 2008; Kühn et al., 2004; Swann 
et al., 2009). Another well known functional theory integrates findings on 
reward processing and reinforcement learning (the reinforcement learning 
theory: Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Studies on reward processing in primates 
show a phasic increase or decrease in activity of the dopamine system when 
90      BLINDED BY AN ERROR 
events are better or worse (respectively) than expected (Schultz, 2000, 
2002). In most cases, errors are events that are worse than expected. These 
dopaminergic reinforcement signals are used for selecting and reinforcing 
the motor controllers to perform the ongoing task optimally. All of the 
functional accounts share the common idea that PES is a compensatory, 
adaptive mechanism aimed at improving performance.  
Non-functional theories, on the other hand, explain PES in terms of 
reduced cognitive processing after errors. Typically, these accounts predict 
PES and post-error accuracy decrease. The bottleneck error-monitoring 
theory (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) claims that 
error monitoring requires time and resources from a capacity-limited central 
information processor. This bottleneck leads to slower and less accurate 
performance when a task immediately follows an error. However, when 
there is enough time between the error and the following trial, compensatory 
mechanisms, like the ones described above, are implemented to prevent 
subsequent mistakes. Another theory that predicts worse performance 
directly after making an error is the orienting account for PES (Notebaert et 
al., 2009). This theory explains PES as the consequence of an orienting 
response to errors. Because errors are mostly infrequent and/or salient 
events, attention is directed towards them and, as a consequence, 
performance on the next trial is disturbed. According to this account there 
should be an attention dip immediately after making an error. A similar 
explanation is postulated in the bidirectional model for attention lapses 
(Cheyne, Carriere, Solman, & Smilek, 2011) where errors caused by lapses 
in attention can on their turn induce dips in attention. A third non-functional 
account explains PES in terms of persistent malfunctioning (Gehring, Goss, 
Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993; Gehring & Knight, 2000), where it is 
argued that the error is caused by a lapse of attention which lingers on to the 
following trial.  
As Danielmeier and Ullsperger (2011) point out in their review on 
post-error adjustments, there is evidence for functional and non-functional 
accounts and these accounts are probably not mutually exclusive. As already 
indicated by Jentzsch and colleagues (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig 
& Jentzsch, 2009), it is conceivable that immediately following the error, 
non-functional effects cause post-error accuracy decrease while cognitive 
mechanisms only kick-in when more time elapsed. In order to understand 
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post-error performance, it is crucial to develop a paradigm that does not rely 
on double errors, as traditional post-error accuracy measurements do. Here, 
we propose a new approach by combining two well-known tasks in cognitive 
psychology, the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and the 
Attentional Blink Paradigm (Chun & Potter, 1995). First, a modified speeded 
Eriksen flanker task that is known to elicit a large amount of errors is 
presented, followed by a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of numbers 
(1 to 9). In 95% of the trials one letter is presented in the RSVP and 
participants have to indicate whether they did or did not see a letter, and if 
they did, which one. The original attentional blink paradigm (Chun & Potter, 
1995) was used as a means to investigate the temporal dynamics of attention 
processes. In numerous studies it has been shown that when two targets are 
presented shortly after each other in a stream of non-target stimuli, it is 
harder to identify the second target (T2) when it is presented within 200 – 
500 ms after the first target. This failure to detect T2 is called the attentional 
blink effect (for a review on the attentional blink paradigm see Shapiro, 
Arnell, & Raymond, 1997 and Martens & Wyble, 2010). Notably, when both 
targets are presented within about 100 ms, T2 is detected much more often; 
this is referred to as lag-1 sparing (Potter, Staub, & O’Connor, 2002). By 
using this paradigm we can measure the effect of accuracy on subsequent 
target detection. 
Non-functional accounts predict worse target detection (more misses 
and more erroneous letters reported) after errors than after correct trials. 
Both the bottleneck (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 
2009), the orienting (Notebaert et al., 2009) and the persistent 
malfunctioning account (Gehring et al., 1993; Gehring & Knight, 2000) 
predict reduced performance after errors. Interestingly, Gehring et al. would 
also predict reduced target detection prior to the error because it is 
reasonable to assume lapses of attention spread out over several trials. The 
functional accounts described above have no clear predictions about post-
error target detection performance. Both the inhibition account 
(Ridderinkhof, 2002; Marco-Pallares et al., 2008) and the reinforcement 
learning account (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) state that detecting an error calls 
for adjustments at the response level. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty students (18 females; age range = 19 - 34 years) of Ghent 
University participated in the study. This study was approved by the ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent 
University and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All 
participants received course credits. 
Apparatus and stimuli.  
The stimuli in the first part of the task consisted of a black arrow 
pointing to the left or the right (i.e. < or >) flanked by two black arrows both 
pointing in the same direction. Therefore, the four possible stimuli 
combinations were <<<, >>>, ><>, <><. In half of the trials the flanking 
arrows pointed in the same direction as the target (i.e. congruent trials) and 
in the other trials they pointed in the opposite direction (i.e. incongruent 
trials). The feedback stimulus was a green J after correct responses, a red F 
after erroneous responses and a black T in case of a too slow response. In the 
second part of the task black digits (all digits between 0 and 10 were 
possible) and an uppercase letter (K, L, D or S) were presented in rapid 
succession. This was followed by the question: “Welk van de vier letters 
(KLDS) heb je gezien?” (i.e. Dutch translation of “Which of the four letters 
(KLDS) have you seen?”). Possible responses could be K, L, D, S or the 
space bar. This latter response indicated that they did not see a letter in the 
RSVP. The participants were tested on a Pentium IV personal computer with 
a 17-inch colour monitor running Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, 
& Vandierendonck, 2006). Responses were given on the keyboard. 
Design 
In the first part of the task participants were asked to respond as fast 
and accurately as possible to direction of the central arrow. In the second 
part of the task the participants had to type the letter they detected in the 
RSVP or, in case they did not detect a letter, press the spacebar to indicate 
that. There were two within-subject factors. The first within-subject factor 
was the accuracy of the response on the flanker task (correct or incorrect) 
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and the second one was the position of the letter in the RSVP (1, 3, or 6). 
The dependent variables were the percentage misses and the percentage error 
detections in the RSVP. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of one trial in Experiment 1 (A), Experiment 2 (B) 
and Experiment 3(C). For the sake of clarity only 8 distracters instead of 14 are 
presented. 
Procedure 
Participants entered a quiet room and sat in front of a computer and 
a keyboard. Instructions appeared on the screen and were supported orally 
by the experimenter. The task and the response mapping were explained and 
the participants were told that in some cases no letter would be presented in 
the RSPV. Participants knew they had a button to indicate that they did not 
see a letter. This response option was created in order to minimise guessing. 
There was one experimental block of 420 trials (see Figure 1 for an overview 
of the trial sequence) with self paced pauses after every sixtieth trial 
(“pause” was presented centrally on the screen). Each trial began with a 
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central fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the presentation of the two 
flanking arrows (< < or > >). After 80 ms the target was presented on the 
screen (> or < in the middle of the flanking arrows). Thirty milliseconds later 
a mask was presented for 150 ms (###). Participants had to press ‘J’ on the 
keyboard with their right index finger when the middle arrow pointed to the 
right and ‘F’ with their left index finger when it pointed to the left. There 
was a response deadline of 1000 ms. Immediately after the response a 
feedback signal appeared on the screen (J in green for correct, F in red for 
incorrect and T in black, for too slow, corresponding to the words ‘juist’, 
‘fout’ and ‘te traag’ in Dutch). This feedback signal was presented for 90 ms, 
followed by a blank screen for 10 ms. The blank screen was followed by an 
RSVP sequence. The sequence consisted of 14 characters. In 95% of the 
trials there were 13 digits as distracters and 1 target letter. In the remaining 
trials there were 14 digits. The digits were chosen randomly, with 
replacement, from the numbers 1-9, with the constraint that digit distracters 
were not repeated within a lag of two characters. The target was randomly 
chosen from the list K, L, D or S. The letter could appear in three possible 
positions: immediately after the feedback signal of the flanker task, on the 
third position in the RSVP or on the sixth position in the RSVP. After the 
RSVP a question appeared on the screen to ask the participants which of the 
four letters they had detected in the RSVP. There was no deadline to respond 
to this second task. In case they had missed the target letter, they had to press 
the spacebar and the word “GEEN” appeared on the screen for 1000 ms. If 
they did see a letter, they had to type it and the letter appeared for 500 ms on 
the screen. This was followed by a feedback signal presented on the screen 
for 500 ms (“FOUT” or “JUIST”, i.e. “wrong” and “correct” in Dutch). This 
was followed by an inter-trial interval of 1500 ms while the screen was 
blank.  
RESULTS 
Trials with a response time that exceeded the response deadline in 
the flanker task (4.6%) and trials where no letter was presented (5%) were 
excluded. Two participants scoring lower than chance level (i.e. 50%) on the 
flanker task were excluded. All analyses were done on the remaining 18 
participants. Where Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to the degrees 
of freedom and p-values were used. However, only the adjusted p-values are 
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reported for the ease of reading. Repeated measures analysis of variance 
(rANOVA) was done on the percentage misses (i.e. where participants 
indicated that they did not see a letter in the number stream) and the 
percentage errors (e.g. occasions where participants responded “L” when “S” 
was presented). Both are reported in the following sections. 
Percentage misses 
A significant main effect of accuracy on the flanker task was found, 
F(1, 17) = 22.083, p < .001,  = .338. More targets were missed after 
making an error on the flanker task (M = 21.78%, SD = 11.95%) than after a 
correct flanker response (M = 10.27%, SD = 9.13%). Both the effect of the 
position of the letter in the RSVP and the interaction effect were not 
significant, both Fs(2, 34) < 1. To have an overview of the data, the 
interaction of both within-subject variables is presented in Figure 2. 
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B. 
 
Figure 2. A. The percentage misses of the target on each of the three 
positions after making an error on the flanker task and after responding 
correctly on the flanker task in Experiment 1 where immediate feedback was 
given. More targets were missed after error execution. B. The percentage 
errors of the target on each of the three positions after making an error on the 
flanker task and after responding correctly on the flanker task. There was no 
effect on the error rates. Error bars represent 95% within-participant 
confidence intervals. 
 
Percentage errors 
A significant main effect of the position of the letter in the RSVP 
was found, F(2, 34) = 8.435, p < .01,  = .332. Most errors were made 
when the target was presented on the sixth position (M = 12.61%, SD = 
10.21%), less when it was presented on the third position (M = 10.68%, SD 
= 8.09%) and least when it was presented on the first position (M = 5.17%, 
SD = 4.22%). Both the effect of the accuracy on the flanker task and the 
interaction effect were not significant, respectively F(1, 17) < 1 and F(2, 34) 
= 1.050, p = .361. 
Additional analysis 
In order to check whether the effect of worse target detection after 
making an error was not part of a dip in attention that spread over several 
trials, we investigated whether errors on the flanker task were preceded by 
more misses on the previous RSVP than correct responses on the flanker 
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task. An rANOVA with within-subjects factor accuracy on the flanker task 
was done on the percentage misses on the previous RSVP. There was no 
significant main effect of accuracy of the response on the flanker task, F(1, 
17) < 1. 
Analysis of Flanker task  
Additionally, we analysed the correct response times and the error 
rates on the congruent and the incongruent stimuli. A paired sample t-test 
showed a congruency effect both on the response times, t(17) = 3.659, p < 
.01, and on the error rates, t(17) = 3.519, p < .01. Participants responded 
slower and made more errors on incongruent stimuli (M = 608.14 ms, SD = 
155.69 and M = 46.34%, SD = 33.72) compared to on congruent stimuli (M 
= 487.24 ms, SD = 108.60 and M = 12.18%, SD = 12.2). The (intended) high 
error rates, especially for incongruent trials, were caused by presenting the 
flanker information first and presenting targets only for 30 ms. 
DISCUSSION 
The results indicate that performance was worse after errors than 
after correct responses and therefore support non-functional accounts. After 
making errors participants missed more targets than after responding 
correctly. Interestingly, they did not make more errors (i.e. reporting the 
wrong target) after errors. Further, a control analysis showed that this is an 
effect of committing an error and not of a prolonged dip in attention.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Because it could be argued that the blink-like effect was driven by 
the presentation of an external feedback signal and not by the error itself a 
second experiment was designed. In Experiment 2, no immediate feedback 
on the flanker task was presented. In a recent study where error frequency 
was manipulated parametrically, PES became smaller as the number of 
errors increased and this was observed both in a condition with and without 
immediate feedback (Houtman, Núñez Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012). 
Therefore, we expect similar effects as in Experiment 1, namely, worse 
target detection after making an error compared to after a correct response 
on the flanker task. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty students (19 females; age range = 18 - 37 years) of Ghent 
University participated based on their written informed consent with 
approval of the ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Educational Sciences of Ghent University and according to the Declaration 
of Helsinki. They all received course credits. The participants were different 
persons than in the first experiment. 
Apparatus and stimuli  
The apparatus and the stimuli were similar as in Experiment 1. The 
only difference was that in this experiment no feedback signals were 
presented in the Flanker task. 
Design and Procedure  
The design was the same as in Experiment 1 except that the 
feedback signal was replaced by a blank screen (see Figure 1 for an 
overview). This was done to keep the timing of the experiment the same as 
in Experiment 1. After every tenth trial, feedback was given about the 
previous 10 responses on the flanker task. 
RESULTS 
Trials with a response time that exceeded the response deadline 
(1%) and trials without letter presentation (5%) were excluded. Two 
participants scoring lower than chance level (i.e. 50%) on the flanker task 
were excluded. All analyses were done on the remaining 18 participants. 
Again, rANOVAs were done on the percentages misses and the percentage 
errors.  
Percentage misses  
Both main effects were significant, accuracy on flanker task: F(1, 
17) = 8.841, p < .01,  = .342, and position in RSVP: F(2, 34) = 8.190, p < 
.01,  = .325. More targets were missed after making an error on the 
flanker task (M = 4.94%, SD = 3.20%) than after a correct flanker response 
(M = 2.79%, SD = 1.87%). The target was missed more when it was 
presented on the first position (M = 5.38%, SD = 4.45%), than when it was 
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presented on the third (M = 2.03%, SD = 1.45%) or the sixth position (M = 
2.43%, SD = 2.44%). The interaction effect, however, was not significant, 
F(2, 34) = 1.581, p = .765.  
Percentage errors  
A significant main effect of accuracy on the flanker task was found, 
F(1, 17) = 8.691, p < .01,  = .338. More errors were made after making an 
error on the flanker task (M = 5.68%, SD = 3.84%) than after responding 
correctly (M = 4.09%, SD = 2.82%). In Figure 3 an overview of the data is 
presented. Both the position of the letter in the RSVP and the interaction 
effect were not significant, respectively F(2, 34) = 1.526, p = .232 and F(2, 
34) < 1.  
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Figure 3. A. The percentage misses of the target on each of the three 
positions after making an error on the flanker task and after responding 
correctly on the flanker task in Experiment 2. More targets were missed after 
error execution. B. The percentage errors of the target on each of the three 
positions after making an error on the flanker task and after responding 
correctly on the flanker task in Experiment 2. More errors were made after 
error execution. Error bars represent 95% within-participant confidence 
intervals. 
 
Additional analysis  
As in Experiment 1, we investigated whether errors on the flanker 
task were preceded with more misses or errors on the previous RSVP than 
correct responses on the flanker task. An rANOVA with within-subjects 
factor accuracy on the flanker task was done, both on the percentage misses 
and the percentage error responses on the previous RSVP. There was no 
significant main effect of accuracy of the response on the flanker task on the 
percentage errors, F(1, 17) < 1, but there was an effect on the percentage 
misses, F(1, 17) = 13.495, p < .01,  = .443. The percentage misses before 
an error (M = 4.52%, SD = 2.64%) was higher than before a correct response 
(M = 3.22%, SD = 1.95%). This indicates that decreased target detection 
after an error needs to be interpreted with caution.  
Analysis of Flanker task  
Again, we analysed the correct response times and the error rates on 
the congruent and the incongruent stimuli of the Flanker task. A paired 
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sample t-test showed a congruency effect both on the response times, t(17) = 
3.597, p < .01, and on the error rates, t(17) = 6.527, p < .001. Participants 
responded slower and made more errors on incongruent stimuli (M = 535.13 
ms, SD = 165.75 and M = 56.20%, SD = 23.73) compared to on congruent 
stimuli (M = 446.19 ms, SD = 110.46 and M = 14.35%, SD = 11.26). As in 
Experiment 1, our procedure of presenting flankers first and targets only for 
30 ms resulted in chance-level performance for incongruent trials. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 further support non-functional accounts 
in the sense that target detection was worse after errors than after correct 
trials. The pattern of results, however, differs from Experiment 1, with 
immediate feedback. In Experiment 2, participants not only missed the target 
more after errors, they also reported the wrong target more frequently. 
However, also on the trial preceding the error, participants missed more 
targets compared to trials preceding correct responses. This suggests that the 
observed post-error attention dip might, at least partially, be the result of an 
attention dip that already existed before making the error and might have 
caused the flanker error in the first place. On the other hand, making an error 
did have an effect on subsequent performance. More target detection errors 
were made after error commission compared to after responding correctly 
and this difference did not exist prior to the error. The results of the two 
experiments combined indicate that making an error has a negative impact 
on performance, supporting non-functional accounts for PES. Tentatively, 
one could argue that with feedback more targets are missed because of 
perceptual limitations (interference between target and feedback), while 
without feedback more targets are incorrectly categorized due to central 
limitations (interference between error processing and letter categorization). 
EXPERIMENT 3 
INTRODUCTION 
In Experiment 3, we wanted to dissociate between the bottleneck 
and the orienting account. The RSVP started with an irrelevant stimulus (a 
green J or a red F) that closely matched the frequency of the feedback signal 
in Experiment 1 and 2 (i.e. J: 60% and F: 40%). In a between subjects design 
the frequency of the red F and the green J was manipulated, in one group a 
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red F was presented frequently and a green J infrequently while in other 
group this frequency was reversed. The orienting account predicts reduced 
performance after infrequent stimuli (Notebaert et al., 2009). The bottleneck 
account on the other hand, would predict reduced performance after red 
signals, irrespective of frequency. The association between red signals and 
errors seems to be quite robust and decreased performance after the 
presentation of red signals has been demonstrated (Elliot, Maier, Moller, 
Friedman, & Meinhardt, 2007). 
METHOD 
Participants 
Thirty-two students ( group 1: 15 females; age range = 18 - 28 years; 
group 2: 8 females; age range = 18 – 26 years) of Ghent University 
participated based on their written informed consent with approval of the 
ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of 
Ghent University and according to the Declaration of Helsinki. They all 
received course credits. The participants were different persons than in the 
first and the second experiment. 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The apparatus and the stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 (see 
Figure 1 for an overview). Except that in this experiment no flanker task was 
presented. Each trial started with a green J or a red F. In one group (N = 16) 
a green J was presented in 60% of the trials and a red F was presented in 
40% of the trials while in the other group a red F was presented in 60% of 
the trials and a green J was presented in 40% of the trials. 
Design and Procedure 
Apart from the exclusion of the flanker task, the design was the 
same as in Experiment 1. Participants were told that the RSVP would start 
randomly with a green J or a red F. 
RESULTS 
Split plot repeated measures ANOVAs were done both on the 
percentage misses and on the percentage errors. 
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Percentage misses 
The results indicated reduced target detection after the red F, 
irrespective of its frequency. This is supported by the interaction between the 
group and the frequency of the irrelevant signal was significant, F(1, 30) = 
10.067, p < .01 ,  = .251. The data pattern showed that that T2 was missed 
more when it was presented after a red F (M = 10.50%, SD = 6.39) then 
when it was presented after a green J (M = 8.48%, SD = 5.44). This was also 
confirmed in a significant post-hoc paired-sample t-test that tested the 
difference between percentage misses after a red irrelevant signal and after a 
green irrelevant signal, t(31) = 3.136, p < .01. There was also a significant 
three-way interaction of position, frequency of the irrelevant signal and 
group, F(2, 60) = 4.441, p = .016 ,  = .129. 
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B. 
 
Figure 4. A. The percentage misses of the target on each of the three 
positions when the RSVP starts with a red F and with a green J in Experiment 
3. More targets were missed after the presentation of the red F. B. The 
percentage errors of the target on each of the three positions. More errors were 
made after the presentation of the red F. Error bars represent 95% within-
participant confidence intervals. 
 
Percentage errors 
There was a main effect of the position of the letter in the RSVP, 
F(2, 60) = 7.828, p < .01,  = .207. The interaction between the group and 
the frequency of the irrelevant signal was significant, F(1, 30) = 4.732, p = 
.038,  = .136. This effect boils down to the fact that more errors were 
made after the presentation of the letter F in red (M = 6.01%, SD = 3.93), 
irrespective of the frequency of the signal, than after the presentation of the 
letter J in green (M = 4.71%, SD = 2.66). None of the other main or 
interaction effects were significant. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 3 demonstrate reduced target detection 
after the presentation of an irrelevant red F, irrespective of its frequency 
(60% or 40%). This effect supports the bottleneck account under the 
assumption that the red stimulus triggered error-like processes that cause a 
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bottleneck in processing capacity and therefore lead to worse performance, 
in terms of more misses and more errors. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Performance after an error was investigated using a new paradigm 
that combined a speeded visual discrimination task with a target detection 
task. In the first experiment immediate feedback was given after every 
response, while in the second experiment no immediate feedback was 
provided. In Experiment 3, the target detection task started with an irrelevant 
stimulus. In Experiment 1 and 2, we observed reduced performance after 
errors and in Experiment 3 reduced performance after a red irrelevant 
stimulus was observed.  
In Experiment 1, feedback was given after every response on the 
flanker task. This feedback was immediately followed by an RSVP. 
Participants had to detect a letter in a stream of numbers. They could 
respond with the letter they detected or indicate that they did not see a target. 
After responding incorrectly in the flanker task and the associated negative 
feedback, more targets were missed than after receiving positive feedback. 
In Experiment 2, the immediate feedback signal was removed. More targets 
were missed after an error compared to after a correct response. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, also more targets were missed before the error indicating that 
participants were already distracted before the error was made. The 
suboptimal performance (possibly a lapse of attention) that caused the error 
was already present in the trial preceding it and lingered on in the trial 
following it (Gehring et al., 1993). In Experiment 2 more target detection 
errors were made after making an error. In this case, participants did notice a 
letter but were not able to discriminate between the letters. These findings 
strengthen the idea of a performance breakdown immediately after making a 
mistake, as proposed by non-functional theories. Both the bottleneck theory 
(Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) and the orienting 
account (Notebaert et al., 2009) can interpret the described results. 
According to the first, error detection is a process that takes time and 
resources that interferes with the next task at hand. Therefore, when a target 
is presented shortly after making an error it is often missed or detected 
incorrectly. The orienting account on the other hand, states that poor target 
detection after errors is induced by an orienting response that has a general 
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impact on the cognitive system. Obviously, the orienting account is more 
intuitive when feedback signals are presented, and orienting to infrequent 
feedback signals interferes with subsequent visual processing. In this respect, 
the high percentage of misses (20%) after errors in Experiment 1 seems to fit 
well with the orienting account. The results of Experiment 2, on the other 
hand, where no feedback signals are presented and errors seem to primarily 
have an effect on target discrimination seem to better fit the bottleneck 
account, where internal error processing interferes with target 
discrimination. 
Experiment 3 was set up dissociate between both theoretical 
propositions. In each trial, the RSVP started with one of two possible 
stimuli. In one group a red F was presented more frequently than a green J, 
while in the other group a green J was presented more frequently than a red 
F. The results showed that more targets were missed and incorrectly reported 
when the RSVP started with red F, irrespective of its frequency. Hence, the 
results did not confirm the frequency-based predictions of the orienting 
account. The results of Experiment 3 therefore favour the bottleneck account 
under the assumption that the red F triggered the error processing 
mechanism and that this caused interference at central processing stages. 
Similarly, Elliot et al. (2007) demonstrated reduced performance after 
presenting red signals to participants in a series of achievement tasks. This 
effect was also explained in terms of the inherent error-value associated with 
the colour red. Consequently, it is conceivable that irrelevant red signals 
triggered error-processing mechanisms that interfered with subsequent target 
detection and categorization. The fact that this effect was short-lived, at least 
in percentage misses, further supports this interpretation. The red signal 
might initiate error processing, but no error is made and hence this process 
can immediately be aborted.  
The results of Experiment 3 favour the bottleneck account, but can 
this account also explain frequency-based effects that provided initial 
support for the orienting account? Houtman et al. (2012) demonstrated 
increased PES in conditions with higher accuracy (lower error rates). 
Similarly, Steinborn et al. (2012) reported larger performance drops (RT and 
error rate increase) following errors for participants with higher accuracy 
rates. Within the orienting account, this has been explained in terms of the 
surprise associated with an error. When errors are infrequent, participants 
CHAPTER 5      107 
will be more surprised by the error and show increased PES. However, this 
frequency effect could also be explained in terms of the bottleneck account. 
Some participants put more resources in error processing than others and 
these participants will show larger performance drops immediately following 
the errors. However, putting more energy in analyzing (the cause of) the 
error will generally improve performance and result in overall higher 
accuracy rates. Similarly, one can assume that participants put more energy 
in processing errors in easy conditions than in hard conditions, where the 
error is often inevitable. However, what remains difficult to explain within a 
bottleneck account is that slowing is observed after infrequent correct trials 
when errors outnumber correct trials, and that slowing is observed after 
completely irrelevant auditory infrequent signals (Notebaert et al., 2009). It 
is therefore likely that both processes, orienting to salient events and 
performance monitoring, both contribute to PES. It is even conceivable that 
both processes are part of an integrated mechanism that detects and 
processes salient events. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present study we introduced a new paradigm to study 
behavioural changes following errors. Previous attempts to investigate 
accuracy changes following errors relied completely on double errors, a 
questionable measure. We demonstrated that target detection was worse after 
errors than after correct trials, with and without immediate feedback. This 
provides strong support for the idea that error processing interferes with 
subsequent information processing.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK MAGNITUDE AND 
FREQUENCY: 
A CHALLENGE FOR THE ORIENTING ACCOUNT
 5
 
 
 
 
 
The orienting account for post-error slowing (PES; Notebaert et al., 
2009) explains the typical slowdown in reaction times (RT) after committing 
an error in terms of an orienting response to infrequent errors. In the 
present study, we set out to investigate how the presentation of feedback 
signals might modulate this post-error orienting response by manipulating 
feedback frequency and magnitude experimentally in an arrow flanker task 
with different reinforcement contexts. Participants were either rewarded for 
correct trials, or punished for error trials. Moreover, both the reward and 
the punishment groups were further divided in a high and low 
reward/punishment condition, resulting in four between-subjects conditions. 
In each of these conditions, occasional infrequent feedback was presented. 
PES was observed in the punishment groups but not in the reward groups. 
However, neither the frequency nor the magnitude of the feedback signal 
influenced subsequent performance. The results pose a challenge for the 
orienting account. 
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Effects of feedback magnitude and frequency: a challenge for the orienting account. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After committing an error in a cognitive task, people typically slow 
down on subsequent trials. This slow down in performance is referred to as 
post-error slowing (PES). Cognitive control theories (for example: the 
conflict monitoring theory: Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001) state that this reflects strategic control applied to perform better on the 
next trial. However, in the literature many different results in terms of post-
error accuracy have been reported. Both a better performance after an error 
(e.g. Laming, 1968), a worse performance (e.g. Fiehler, Ullsperger, & von 
Cramon, 2005) and a status quo (King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 
2010) have been covered. Recently, the orienting account explained PES in 
terms of an orienting response induced by the infrequent nature of errors in 
most experimental tasks (Notebaert et al., 2009). Post-error slowing was 
observed in a condition with 75% correct responses and post-correct slowing 
was observed when only 35% responses were correct. In other words, 
participants slowed down after infrequent events.  
In another experiment Notebaert et al. (2009) presented task 
irrelevant auditory oddballs on 25% of the trials. As has been found in other 
studies (Barcelo, Escera, Corral, & Perianez, 2006), participants slowed 
down after the appearance of an oddball, which is referred to as post-oddball 
slowing (POS). However, while keeping the frequency of errors and 
oddballs equal across experiments, PES (25 ms) was remarkably larger than 
POS (9 ms). One explanation for this discrepancy is that errors are more 
significant than irrelevant oddballs and that the orienting and the subsequent 
slowing depend on the significance. Additional support for our hypothesis 
that error significance plays a role in the size of PES comes from a social 
cognition study (Núñez Castellar, Notebaert, Van den Bossche, & Fias, 
2011) that investigated behavioural effects after error observation. In this 
experiment two participants alternated in performing an arrow flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) while the social context was manipulated. In the 
competitive condition the best performing participant of a pair received a 
monetary reward, while in the cooperative condition, the best pair of 
participants among all pairs received a monetary reward. In both conditions 
participants slowed down after observing an error, but slowing in 
cooperation was twice as large as in competition (cooperation: 63 ms vs. 
competition: 32 ms). This can be explained by the difference in significance 
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of the observed error in both conditions. When you observe the other 
participant making an error in a competitive context this has no impact on 
your own score. However, when you observe your partner whom you are 
cooperating with making an error, this also affects your score. Therefore, 
this observed error is more significant to you.  
To specifically test whether error significance has an impact on PES, 
we created four between-subject conditions where the significance of the 
error was manipulated by implementing different reinforcement contexts; 
two groups were punished for making an error and two groups were 
rewarded for correct responses. Both groups (reward and punishment) were 
further subdivided in a high and low value group, resulting in a high and a 
low reward and a high and a low punishment group. Each group received its 
normal feedback on 85% of the cases, while receiving deviant feedback in 
15% of the cases. Consequently, after correct trials, the high reward group 
received high reward in 85% of the correct trials and low reward in 15% of 
the correct trials, whereas the low reward group received low reward after 
correct trials in 85% and high reward in 15% of the cases. The same was true 
for the punishment groups, as the high punishment group received high 
punishment following errors in 85% of the cases and low punishment in 15% 
of the cases, and the low punishment group received low punishment 
following 85% of the error trials and high punishment following 15% of the 
errors. This manipulation enables us to test the effect of feedback frequency 
on subsequent performance.  
Because we know that the orienting response to an event is 
influenced by the significance of the event (Bernstein, 1969; Bradley, 2009) 
more PES in the punishment than in the reward condition is predicted. In the 
punishment conditions, attention is directly drawn to errors and we expect 
errors to become more significant. In the reward conditions, attention is 
drawn to correct responses and error significance is reduced. Furthermore, in 
the punishment condition, we predict more PES in the high punishment 
group than in the low punishment group because errors are more significant 
when they are more punished. The effect of feedback frequency is expected 
to interact with reinforcement context and predictions are most clear in the 
low punishment group where we expect that infrequent high punishment will 
result in increased PES. In the high punishment group, one could expect 
increased PES after infrequent low punishment on the basis of frequency-
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based orienting (Notebaert et al., 2009), or decreased PES on the basis of its 
decreased saliency. In the reward conditions, we expect slower RTs after 
infrequent reward than after frequent reward. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Eighty-three students (74 females, average age of 21 years and 5 
months) of Ghent University participated based on their written informed 
consent with approval of the local ethical committee and according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki. They received 8€ for their participation. In every 
group the participant with the most accurate performance was rewarded with 
a 10€ voucher. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
groups. 
APPARATUS AND STIMULI  
On every trial the participants had to identify the centre stimulus of a 
horizontal stimulus array. A centrally presented arrowhead was flanked by 
two arrowheads on each side (e.g. >><>>). These flanking arrowheads could 
point to the same direction of the central stimulus (i.e. a congruent trial) or to 
the opposite direction (i.e. an incongruent trial). The target and the flankers 
were black arrows printed on a white background. Participants had to press 
the left button on a cedrus-response box with their left index finger when the 
central arrow pointed to left and vice versa. The participants were tested on a 
Pentium IV personal computer with a 17-inch colour monitor running 
Tscope (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006). 
DESIGN  
There were two within-subject factors and two between-subject 
factors. The within-subject factors were frequency of the feedback (frequent 
or infrequent) and the accuracy of the previous trial (correct or error). The 
first between-factor was context (reward or punishment). The second was the 
magnitude of the feedback (mostly high or mostly low). Combining these 
between-subject factors resulted in four groups. Two groups were rewarded 
for a correct response and two groups were punished for an error or a too 
slow response. Within each context one group received mostly (85%) a low 
value as feedback and sometimes (15%) a high value as feedback, in the 
CHAPTER 6      117 
other group this was vice versa (e.g. in the high value punishment feedback 
group participants, when punished, lost 10 points in 85% of cases and only 1 
point in 15% of the cases). The magnitude of the feedback was implemented 
this way in order for subjects to have a relative idea of high and low 
magnitude. 
PROCEDURE 
The participants entered a slightly dimmed room and took place in 
front of a computer. There were two practice blocks and one experimental 
block. After signing the informed consent the instructions for the first 
practice block were given verbally by the experimenter and were printed on 
the screen. Important, all participants received the same instructions. Both 
the task and the feedback signals were explained. This first practice block 
consisted of 30 trials without response deadline. Each trial began with a 
central fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the presentation of the flankers 
with centrally a blank space (>> >> or << <<) for 80 ms. While the flankers 
stayed on the screen the target was presented for 30 ms. This presentation 
was masked (#####) for 150 ms. After that the participants were able to 
press one of the two response buttons. This was immediately followed by a 
feedback signal (J for correct, F for incorrect, corresponding to the words 
correct (i.e. juist) and error (i.e. fout) in Dutch). The feedback stimuli were 
presented for 500 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms, resulting in an 
inter trial interval of 100 ms. 
Before the second practice block began, the participants were told 
that in this block there would be a response deadline and therefore a new 
feedback signal, indicating too slow responses, was introduced. The second 
practice block consisted of 300 trials with a response deadline of 740 ms. 
When participants did not respond within 740 ms, a feedback signal was 
presented to indicate that they responded too slow (T). There was a self 
paced break after 80 trials.  
When the experimental block started new instructions were 
presented on the screen. Instructions were different depending on the 
reinforcement group. Participants in the reward groups were told that they 
would win sometimes many points and sometimes a small amount of points 
for every correct response they gave. The one with the most points out of 20 
participants would receive a 10€ voucher. The punishment groups were told 
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that they started the experiment with 5000 points and that they would lose 
many or just a little bit of points for every erroneous or too slow response. 
The participant with the most points left at the end of the experiment would 
receive a 10€ voucher. All groups were asked to respond as fast and accurate 
as possible.  
The experimental block consisted of 1200 trials. The trial sequence 
was the same as in the practice block, only the feedback signal differed 
between the four groups, see Figure 1. Both the accuracy and the points that 
were gained or lost were presented. In the punishment context the participant 
saw how much they lost in case of a wrong or too slow answer (e.g. F -1), 
when they responded correctly they saw the same feedback signal as in the 
practice block (i.e. J). In the reward context, they saw how much they gained 
for a right answer (e.g. J +1), after committing an error or responding too 
slow the same feedback signal as in the practice block was presented (i.e. T 
for too slow and F for incorrect response). The frequency of small 
reward/loss (1) and big reward/loss (10) was either 85% or 15 % (where the 
15% trials were never repeated on successive trials).  
RESULTS 
Trials with a response time that exceeded the response deadline or 
that were faster than 200 ms and the immediately following trial were 
excluded from the data. Also the first trial after every pause was excluded. 
As a result, 11% of the data was excluded. From the remaining trials reaction 
times (RTs) more or less than three standard deviations from the mean were 
removed per participant. 
PRACTICE BLOCK 
To check whether there were a priori differences between the four 
groups, the data of the second practice block were analysed. Repeated 
measures ANOVAs were done, both on the correct RTs and on the error 
proportions. In both analyses the independent variables were accuracy of the 
previous trial (correct or incorrect), whether the participants were punished 
or rewarded (context) and whether this punishment/reward was high or low 
(magnitude).  
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Reaction times  
There was a significant main effect of previous accuracy, F(1,79) = 
13.020, p = .001. Participants responded slower after making an error, (M = 
460.4 ms, SD = 78.7 ms), compared to after a correct response, (M = 446.9 
ms, SD = 70.2 ms). This reflects the PES effect of 13.5 ms. All other main 
and interaction effects were not significant (all Fs(1,79) < 1, ns).  
Error proportions  
The factor previous accuracy had a significant effect on the error 
proportions, F(1,79) = 16.047, p < .001. Error proportions after an error (M 
= 30.8%, SD = 13.9%) were higher compared to after a correct response (M 
= 27.7%, SD = 12.7%). None of the other main and interaction effects were 
significant (Fs(1,79), ps < .16).  
EXPERIMENTAL BLOCK: OVERALL ANALYSIS 
A split plot ANOVA was conducted on correct reaction times and 
error rates with one within-subjects factor, accuracy of the previous trial 
(correct, error) and two between-subjects factors reinforcement context 
(punishment, reward) and the magnitude of the feedback (mostly high or 
mostly low). Frequency was ignored in this overall analysis because in the 
punishment group, infrequent feedback is error feedback while in the reward 
condition, infrequent feedback is correct feedback. 
Correct reaction times  
There was a main effect of previous accuracy, F(1,79) = 8.005, p = 
.006. Correct RTs were longer after an error (M = 439.4 ms, SD = 60.7 ms) 
than after a correct trial (M = 432.0 ms, SD = 53.1 ms). We also found a 
two-way interaction effect of accuracy of the previous trial and the context, 
F(1,79) = 4.019, p < .05. In line with our first prediction, PES was larger in 
the punishment conditions (M = 12.4 ms, SD = 26.1 ms) than in the reward 
conditions (M = 2.1 ms, SD = 19.2 ms) (see Figure 1). Actually, planned 
comparisons showed that PES was significant in the punishment conditions 
(t(42) = 3.102, p < .01) and absent in the reward conditions (t(39) = 0.688, p 
= .496). There was no interaction between accuracy of the previous trial and 
the magnitude, F(1,79) < 1, and also the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1,79) = 1.732, p = .192. This is against our expectations of 
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finding a modulation of the PES-effect in the punishment groups by the 
feedback magnitude. 
 
Figure 1. Mean correct RTs after errors and after correct responses in 
the punishment groups and in the reward groups. The error bars represent the 
lower and the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval. There is PES in the 
punishment groups but not in the reward groups. 
 
Error proportions 
The factor accuracy of the previous trial had a significant main effect on the error 
proportions, F(1,79) = 16.047, p < .001. Interestingly, we observed post-error 
accuracy decrease because error rates were higher after making an error (M = 
27.7%, SD = 14.7 %) than after a correct response (M = 24.5%, SD = 15.3%). All 
other main and interactions effects were not significant (Fs(1,79), ps < .27) (see 
Table 1). Consequently, error rates were the same in all groups. 
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Table 2. Error rates were always higher after errors than after correct 
responses. Crucially, overall accuracy did not differ between punishment 
groups and reward groups. 
Reinforcement 
context 
Low High 
Marginal 
accuracy After 
error 
After 
correct 
After 
error 
After 
correct 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Punishment 29.0 12.5 24.8 13.9 26.7 16.7 23.8 18.4 75.1 16.0 
Reward 30.4 13.4 26.2 14.0 26.4 16.1 23.5 15.7 74.3 14.7 
Note. Mean error rates and standard deviations of the error rates 
are presented in percentages. 
EXPERIMENTAL BLOCK: EFFECT OF FREQUENCY 
The effect of feedback frequency was investigated by means of 
planned comparisons t-tests (infrequent-frequent).  
Correct Reaction Times  
Contrary to our predictions, no increased PES was found after 
infrequent high punishment in the low punishment group, t(20) = 0.258, p = 
.799. Also in the high punishment group, there was no difference between 
RTs after infrequent low punishment and frequent high punishment, t(21) = 
1.169, p = .256. Therefore, we can conclude that the frequency manipulation 
had no effect on PES in the punishment groups. In the low reward group 
correct RTs after infrequent high reward were not slower than after frequent 
low reward, t(19) = 0.300, p = .768. In the high reward group, however, RTs 
after frequent high reward (M = 436.90ms, SD = 56.86) were slower than 
after infrequent low reward (M = 428.72ms, SD = 64.05), t(19) 2.285, p = 
.034.  
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Error Rates  
Both in the low punishment group, t(20) = -0.839, p = .412, and in 
the high punishment group, t(21) = 0.237, p = .815, there was no difference 
between error rates after frequent low/high punishment and infrequent 
high/low punishment. Again, there was no effect of the frequency 
manipulation post-error accuracy decrease in both punishment groups. In the 
low reward group, error rates were slightly higher after frequent low reward 
(M = 26.5%, SD = 13.9%) than after infrequent high reward (M = 24.3%, SD 
= 15.1%), t(19) = 2.917, p = .009. In the high reward group, however, there 
was no difference in error rates, t(19) = -0.019, p = .929. 
Correlations 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to 
assess the relationship between the size of the PES effect and the mean 
accuracy (see Figure 2). There was a significant positive correlation between 
the two variables, r(83) = 0.463, p < .001. Because there were no group 
differences in terms of accuracy rates, this correlation reflects a relation 
between individuals’ error rates and PES, with more slowing as errors 
become less expected. 
 
Figure 2. The scatterplot of mean accuracy and the difference between 
correct RTs after correct response and after errors shows that higher accuracy 
goes together with a larger PES effect. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study we investigated the influence of feedback frequency 
and magnitude on subsequent behaviour. We therefore created four 
reinforcement contexts. Half of the participants were punished for errors and 
half of them were rewarded for correct trials. Under the assumption that 
punishing errors directs more attention to errors than rewarding correct trials, 
we predicted more PES in the punishment group, which was confirmed. 
However, PES was not larger for a group that generally received larger 
punishment after errors, and also the frequency of the feedback signal did 
not systematically affect subsequent performance. 
PES ONLY IN THE PUNISHMENT CONDITIONS 
Studies that investigate response-locked event-related potentials 
(ERPs) also demonstrated an influence of punishing errors on error-related 
ERPs. The error-related negativity (ERN), a negative deflection that appears 
50 – 200 ms after committing an error (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & 
Donchin, 1993; Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990) was 
larger for high compared to low monetary value errors and when being 
evaluated compared to not being evaluated (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & 
Simons, 2005). However, it should be noted that no behavioural differences 
were found in this study.  
Delgado, Locke, Stenger and Fiez (2003) investigated the activity of 
the striatum following high or low rewarding or punishing feedback in an 
fMRI study and observed that the left dorsal striatum differentiated between 
reward and punishment. More precisely, the activation of the left caudate 
nucleus depended on the magnitude of the reward, where high reward was 
correlated with the highest activation and high punishment with the lowest 
activation. However, this pattern was only true in the 6- to 9-second interval 
after presenting the feedback. Earlier, in the 3- to 6-second time interval, the 
reversed pattern was observed, with highest activation after high punishment 
feedback and lowest after the high reward feedback. One of the possible 
explanations Delgado and colleagues put forward is an early autonomic 
response preceding a cognitive process. Several autonomic responses have 
been reported after an erroneous response (Danev & de Winter, 1971, 
Critchly, Tang, Glaser, Btterworth, & Dolan, 2005) and after negative 
feedback (Somsen, Van der Molen, Jennings, & Van Beek, 2000). These 
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autonomic responses have been interpreted as an orienting response (see Van 
der Molen, Bashore, Halliday, & Callaway, 1991, for a review). In fact, the 
early autonomic response in Delgado and colleagues’ study could be an 
orienting response due to the presentation of the large punishment. 
The observation that PES is only observed in our punishment 
conditions (with no pre-existing group differences) fits the orienting account, 
and is in line with previous research. Alternatively, one might argue that 
punishment and reward induced different emotional states. While 
punishment might have induced a negative emotion, reward possibly 
induced a positive emotion. It has been argued that positive emotions reduce 
cognitive control processes or increase flexibility (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; 
Braver & Cohen, 2000; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Within the orienting 
account, one could argue that increased positive affect due to the reward 
manipulation increases flexibility and hence decreases the distraction caused 
by the error. Note that this argument fits well, when comparing PES scores 
of the reward and the punishment groups with their PES scores before the 
implementation of the reinforcement schedule. This comparison indicates 
that PES did not change in the punishment group, while PES dropped from 
13.5 ms to 2.1 ms the reward group.  
On the other hand, studies investigating error monitoring in short-
term changes of emotion (Wiswede, Münte, Goschke, & Rüsseler, 2009) or 
state anxiety (Hajcak et al., 2003; Moser et al., 2005) failed to find an effect 
on PES. Moreover, Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, and Sommer (2011) observed 
increased ERN and PES in a reward condition. The fact that more PES was 
observed in the reward than the punishment condition (contrary to our 
findings) can be explained in terms of the specific reinforcement schedule. 
Stürmer et al. rewarded the 25% fastest correct responses in one condition 
and punished the 25% slowest correct responses in another. Crucially, errors 
were punished in both conditions, which was not the case in our reward 
condition. Punishing errors in a reward context presumably results in 
increased rather than decreased sensitivity to errors. Taken together, the 
present findings together with the results of Stürmer et al. are easier to 
explain in terms of error saliency rather than mood differences. 
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NO EFFECT OF MAGNITUDE AND HALF AN EFFECT OF FREQUENCY  
In line with previous reports in our lab (Notebaert et al., 2009; 
Nunez Castellar, et al., 2010; Nunez Castellar, et al., 2011; Houtman, Nunez 
Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012), we expected increased PES when errors are 
more salient. Surprisingly, PES was not larger in the high punishment group 
than the low punishment group. In our defense, we could argue that our 
between-subjects manipulation of punishment magnitude went unnoticed to 
the participants. Note that we created our contexts by usually giving high or 
usually giving low reward/punishment, in order to also investigate the effect 
of frequency. It is also possible that this blurred the differences between our 
high and low conditions. In a monetary gambling task, Wu and Zhou (2009) 
found an effect of valence of feedback but not of the magnitude of the 
feedback on choice behaviour. Participants had to choose between a left and 
a right pile and could either win or lose 0.5 or 2.5 yuan and were more likely 
to select the same card when it was rewarded in the previous trial, compared 
to when it was punished. The size of the reward did not have an impact on 
this choice behaviour. However, the most stringent prediction was 
formulated within the low punishment group. This group occasionally 
received high punishment for errors, which should have led to increased 
slowing. The fact that this is not observed poses a real challenge for the 
orienting account. Moreover, a similar effect of frequency was expected in 
the reward conditions. However, frequent high reward was followed by 
slower responses than infrequent low reward in the high reward group. How 
do we integrate these findings with previous reports of slowing after 
irrelevant unexpected feedback? One possibility is that participants did not 
pay attention to the complex feedback signal and only relied on internal error 
monitoring. The fact that there is an overall difference between the 
punishment and the reward group does not necessarily indicate that feedback 
signals were processed on a trial-by-trial basis, as this information was 
delivered during the instructions. Still, this finding is at odds with the 
observation that participants were slower after infrequent feedback than after 
frequent feedback in the Notebaert et al., (2009) study. In the present study, 
feedback signals were visual, whereas Notebaert et al. used auditory stimuli. 
As a matter of fact, it is not the first time that we fail to find a frequency 
effect of visual stimuli. In Houtman et al. (submitted), we report a series of 
experiments where we demonstrate an attentional blink following errors. In a 
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final experiment, we failed to find an effect of frequency of irrelevant visual 
signals. Similarly, in an unpublished dataset, we failed to observe post-
oddball slowing after irrelevant visual signals in an otherwise identical setup 
as Notebaert et al. Experiment 2. These data indicate that visual feedback is 
perhaps less salient than auditory feedback, and that trial-by-trial differences 
in visual feedback can go unnoticed. Support for this claim can be found in 
oddball literature. The observation that distraction following oddballs (post-
oddball slowing) is only observed after auditory oddballs and not after visual 
oddballs is in line with this suggestion (Leiva & Parmentier, 2011). 
On the other hand, the present set of data again confirms that error 
frequency has an important impact on PES, as participants with less errors 
showed increased PES. This finding can be considered as the most important 
support for the orienting account. Note that this effect has also been 
observed without feedback (Houtman et al., 2012). Similarly, Steinborn, 
Flehmig, Bratzke, and Schröter (2012) reported that differences in accuracy 
(although the range was rather small, from 94% to 99%) resulted in 
differences in PES. When classifying participants into three groups 
according to their accuracy, it was shown that PES was largest in the high 
accurate group and smallest in the low accurate group. This leaves us to 
conclude that internal error detection triggers on orienting response and 
results in PES (in relation to the frequency of errors), that irrelevant auditory 
feedback signals trigger an orienting response and subsequent slowing, and 
that visual feedback signals do not trigger an orienting response, and do not 
result in slowing. It remains to be investigated whether trial-by-trial 
variations in auditory feedback magnitude and frequency influence 
subsequent behaviour. 
REDUCED PERFORMANCE AFTER ERRORS 
Remarkably, performance did not improve after making an error. It 
is important to point out that this post-error accuracy decrease is the same in 
all conditions although post-error RTs did change between groups. It is clear 
that in this case post-error RT changes were not part of a more cautious 
response style in order to improve performance. This is in line with recent 
findings of King and colleagues (2010) who also found no correlation 
between PES and post-error accuracy. However, they found that there was 
no change in accuracy after making an error compared to after responding 
correctly. Interestingly, they observed a negative correlation between PES 
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and response-related sensorimotor cortex activity. Apart from an explanation 
in terms of a motor inhibition account (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, 
Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011), it could also be that the distraction caused 
by the error resulted in decreased motor activation. It should be noted that 
Hajcak and colleagues (2003) did find a positive correlation between post-
error accuracy and PES, although performance was not better after errors 
than after correct responses. However, in the study of Steinborn et al. (2012) 
post-error accuracy decrease correlated with PES. Like PES, post-error 
accuracy decrease was bigger in the high accuracy group than in the low 
accuracy group. Future research is needed to investigate this in more detail. 
CONCLUSION 
The present study did not reveal the expected effect of frequency 
and magnitude of visual feedback. In line with smaller oddball interference 
in the visual than the auditory domain, we suspect that visual trial-by-trial 
variations in feedback go unnoticed. However, post-error slowing was only 
observed when errors were punished, and post-error slowing correlated with 
error frequency, as predicted by the orienting account. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation we proposed and investigated a new account for 
post-error slowing. The orienting account states that post-error slowing is 
highly influenced by the frequency of errors in that context. The view on 
error processing was broadened and support for non-functional error 
processing theories in general was provided. In this final chapter I will give 
an overview of the empirical findings obtained in Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. I 
will integrate these results and discuss recent literature regarding the 
orienting account. 
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THE ORIENTING ACCOUNT 
In Chapter 2 the orienting account was proposed. One of the most 
reported behavioural adjustments after making an error is the slowdown in 
reaction times. This effect is referred to as the post-error slowing effect and 
was originally described by Rabbitt (1966) and Laming (1968) and 
interpreted as a cautious response style in order to improve behaviour. The 
idea that post-error slowing serves as a remedial action in order to prevent 
further erring is also reflected in cognitive control theories. According to 
these theories, post-error slowing should go together with post-error 
accuracy improvement. However, an overview of the literature learns that 
this is not always the case (Hajcak & Simons, 2008; Cheyne, Carriere, & 
Smilek, 2009; Steinborn, Flehmig, Bratzke, & Schröter, 2012; Rabbitt & 
Rogers, 1977). Remarkebly, patients with a lesion in the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) still show post-error slowing (Stemmer, Segalowitz, Witzke, 
& Schönle, 2004). Starting from these observations and the observation that 
in typical tasks used in the laboratory errors occur only rarely we began to 
develop a new account for post-error slowing. 
From learning psychology we know that rare events elicit an 
orienting response that causes attentional capture. Besides this, the orienting 
response also evokes some changes in the autonomic nervous system (ANS). 
Hajcak, Simons and McDonald (2003) reported that making an error is 
followed by heart rate deceleration, pupil dilation and increased skin 
conductance. The orienting account proposes that, in most experiments, 
post-error slowing is caused by an orienting response elicited by the relative 
infrequency of the error itself. Two hypotheses were formulated. First, 
slowing should occur after infrequent events, when correct responses are 
relatively infrequent, we would expect post-correct slowing. Second, also 
irrelevant events that occur during the task should have this effect in case 
they are infrequent.  
In order to test this two experiments were set up, one to verify the 
first hypothesis and one to verify the second hypothesis. In Experiment 1 we 
used a newly designed adaptive paradigm during a four choice colour 
discrimination task. There were three within-subjects conditions that aimed 
at different levels of accuracy, respectively 35% accuracy, 55% accuracy 
and 75% accuracy. During each condition the darkness of the colour was 
CHAPTER 7      133 
adapted when the average accuracy of the previous 20 trials was not the 
same as the accuracy aimed for in that condition. For example, when the 
average accuracy of the previous 20 trials was higher than 55% in the 55% 
accuracy condition, the colour of the square would become slightly darker. 
When the average accuracy was lower than 55% correct responses then the 
colour would become slightly brighter and as a consequence become slightly 
easier to discriminate. Immediate feedback was given in the form a visual 
presentation of a letter (an “F” when an error was made, a “J” when the 
response was correct and a “T” when the response deadline was reached). 
In line with the first hypothesis, post-correct slowing was found in 
the 35% accuracy condition. In the 75% accuracy condition post-error 
slowing was observed, while in the 55% accuracy condition no effect of 
accuracy of the previous trial on reaction times was found. It was not 
possible to interpret accuracy changes after errors or after correct responses 
because the error frequency was manipulated constantly during the 
experiment. 
In order to investigate hypothesis 2, we designed a second 
experiment where an irrelevant signal substitutes the feedback signal. Our 
hypothesis that irrelevant infrequent stimuli would also evoke a slowing in 
response times was already indirectly confirmed in a study by Barcelo, 
Escera, Corral and Periáñez (2006) where occasionally (26 times in a block 
of 140 trials) a novel unique sound was presented. Reaction times were 
indeed slower following these novel sounds, which is in line with our 
orienting account. Because all novel sounds were only presented once in that 
study, we wanted to investigate possible slowing after irrelevant sounds 
where the frequency more closely matched the frequency of errors in typical 
experiments. In 75% of the trials a high or a low tone (depending on the 
condition the participant was in) was presented at the time where in the first 
experiment a feedback signal was presented. In the remaining 25% of the 
trials a low or a high tone was presented. The results demonstrate slowing 
after infrequent irrelevant acoustic signals in line with the orienting account 
for post-error slowing. Moreover, the lack of a post-error accuracy effect in 
combination with post-error slowing also fits the orienting account. 
One important note to make about the obtained results is that in 
experiment 1 feedback was given on every trial. Thus, between responding 
on one trial and the start of the next trial a visual signal was presented that 
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indicated whether your response was correct, incorrect or too slow. The 
implications of the orienting account would be quite limiting if they would 
only hold in cases where external feedback is presented. However, studies 
investigating ANS correlates of error monitoring indicate that this is not the 
case. Crone, Somsen, Van Beek and Van Der Molen (2004) demonstrated 
heart rate deceleration after error feedback, which was also observed by 
Hajcak et al. (2003) on errors in a task without feedback. Interestingly, also 
this heart rate deceleration is an index of the orienting response (e.g., Hare, 
1973). Consequently, heart rate measurements on tasks with and without 
feedback indicate an important role for orienting responses towards errors 
and error feedback. In order to investigate this more thoroughly we designed 
an experiment presented in Chapter 3. 
THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK 
Imagine sitting on the train, working on a text and not noticing that 
you have to grab your stuff together to jump off the train. All of a sudden 
you do notice you have to get off and because you hurry so much you forget 
your scarf. In some cases, someone will shout “Hey! You forgot your 
scarf!”. You will walk back and gratefully get your scarf. In other cases you 
will have the ‘feeling’ you forgot something and walk back to your seat. In 
the first example you received external feedback, while in the second 
example you relied on your internal error monitoring system to notice your 
mistake.  
After we tested the basic assumption of the orienting account we 
wanted to expand the implications of the account. The goal in Chapter 3 
was to replicate the findings presented in Chapter 2 in a task without 
immediate feedback. This was done by splitting the group of participants in 
two. One group received feedback after every response, whereas the other 
group only received feedback after every fiftieth trial. Because the orienting 
account predicts different sizes of post-error slowing depending on the 
amount of errors that were made, we created three accuracy conditions: 50% 
accurate, 70% accurate and 90% accurate.  
The same adaptive program as in Chapter 2 was used with a slight 
modification. This time the stimulus discriminability was only adjusted in 
the beginning of the experiment until a stable level of accuracy, that was 
aimed for in that condition, was reached. This allowed us to measure post-
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error accuracy changes. The orienting account predicts a higher error rate 
after unexpected errors than after correct trials. When attention is drawn 
away from the task by an error, the obligatory shifting back to the task could 
result in more errors on top of response slowing. Functional theories, on the 
other hand, predict that accuracy improves because of the remedial post-
error slowing.  
Post-error slowing was largest in the 90% accuracy condition, 
smaller in the 70% accuracy condition and not existing in the 50% condition. 
These findings are in line with the hypothesis made by the orienting account, 
and with previous findings in Chapter 2. The main research question was 
whether this pattern was different without immediate feedback presentation. 
Indeed, there was no difference between both conditions. However, one 
limitation to this study is that feedback presentation was manipulated 
between subjects. It remains an open question whether the same results 
would be found in a within subjects design. The theoretical implication that 
derives from this experiment is that the orienting response to externally 
indicated and internally detected infrequent errors is the same. It could be 
that the orienting response after errors is triggered by an internal error signal. 
However, in studies where false error feedback is delivered, post-error 
slowing is present only after incorrect responses but not after correct 
responses (de Bruijn, Mars, & Hulstijn, 2004).  
As described in Chapter 1, in event-related potential studies (ERP 
studies) it has been shown that the error-locked PE and the stimulus-locked 
P3 show many similarities (Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; 
Ridderinkhof, Ramautar, & Wijnen, 2009). In an ERP study done in our 
research group (Nunez Castellar, Kuhn, Fias, & Notebaert, 2010) the same 
experiment as presented in Chapter 2 was done. However, only the 35% 
accuracy and the 75% accuracy condition were used. In the first condition 
post-correct slowing was found and the second condition post-error slowing 
was found. Furthermore, it was shown that the amplitudes of the P3 
correlated with slowing on the next trial, whereas the amplitudes of the ERN 
did not correlate.  
According to the results found in this Chapter we can safely assume 
that the orienting response to errors with and without immediate feedback is 
in essence the same. Based on this assumption and the findings of the ERP 
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study of Nunez-Castellar et al. we designed an ERP experiment presented in 
Chapter 3. 
THE PE AS AN INDEX FOR ORIENTING TO ERRORS 
After we confirmed that the frequency dependent orienting response 
to errors did not differ with or without immediate feedback, we wanted to 
test the relation between neural correlates of making an error and 
behavioural adjustments afterwards. Because it is not possible to investigate 
error-locked potentials when a feedback signal is presented immediately 
after the response, the participants were presented with a task without 
immediate feedback.  
The two error-related potentials of interest in Chapter 4 are the 
ERN, peaking between 0 and 100 ms after error commission, and the PE, a 
positive deflection between 200 ms and 400 ms after the error response. The 
same rationale as in the study of Nunez-Castellar et al., 2010, was used. 
Namely, participants are presented with a difficult and an easy condition. 
However, instead of using an adaptive program all participants saw the same 
stimuli. The difficulty manipulation was established by creating a condition 
with a 2:1 stimulus response mapping and a more difficult condition with a 
4:1 stimulus response mapping. More errors were made in the difficult 
condition than in the easy condition, although this effect was not large (on 
average 9% more errors in difficult condition).  
The results of this study were somewhat surprising and pose a 
challenge for the orienting account defended in the previous chapters. 
Although there was difference in error rates, there was no difference in post-
error slowing at least not on group level. Correlation analyses per condition 
showed that there was an error frequency effect on post-error slowing on 
individual level. Participants with the highest error rate also showed smallest 
post-error slowing, in both conditions. This same correlation was reported in 
a study done by Steinborn and colleagues (2012). In a task with accuracies 
ranging from 94% to 99% it was shown that participants with the highest 
accuracy rates also show the most post-error slowing. 
In the ERP-data we did find a difference between both conditions. 
Both the ERN and the PE were more pronounced in the easy condition than 
in the difficult condition. This effect replicates previous findings that also 
report a smaller ERN and PE when participants make more errors (Santesso, 
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Segalowitz, & Schmidt, 2006). Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) found that by 
increasing task difficulty, participants made more errors but this did not 
diminish ERN amplitude. Instead, it was the participants’ certainty of having 
erred that predicted ERN amplitude.  
When combining the ERP-data and the behavioural adjustments data 
we found that only the PE correlated with post-error slowing. The PE can be 
interpreted as an internal marker for orienting to errors. Comparable with the 
P3’s dependency of the saliency of a presented stimulus, the PE seems to 
play a similar role for internally detected salient events. Our results are very 
similar to the ones reported by Nùñez-Castellar et al. (2010). Whereas they 
found the P3 to be largest after the least frequent presented feedback signal, 
the PE was largest in the condition with less error rates and largest for 
participants with the smallest error rate. As previously suggested 
(Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000) the PE might reflect 
the subjective significance of an error. This interpretation is in line with 
studies investigating EPR-correlates of unaware errors (Nieuwenhuis, 
Ridderinkhof, Blow, Band, & Kok, 2001; Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; 
O'Connell et al., 2007; Shalgi et al., 2009; Dhar, Wiersema, & Pourtois, 
2011; Wessel, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011; Endrass, Klawohn, Preuss, 
& Kathmann, 2012). In these studies no PE is found when participants are 
unaware of their errors. In the study of Endrass and colleagues a choice 
selection task was used where errors were induced by manipulating 
perceptual difficulty. In that way differences in ERPs related to the 
awareness of the accuracy of the response could be investigated. 
Remarkably, the PE was not only larger for unaware errors than for aware 
errors, but also larger for unaware correct responses than for aware correct 
responses. Similarly, post-response slowing was more pronounced following 
perceived than following unperceived errors but reaction times were also 
slower following unperceived correct responses. In line with the orienting 
account post-error slowing was related to perceived incorrectness of a 
response rather than being an automatic adjustment process apart from 
conscious error perception. 
A DROP IN ATTENTION 
In Chapter 5 we wanted to investigate a hypothesis made by the 
orienting account regarding the disturbance in attention you would expect 
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after making an infrequent error. Furthermore, this would allow us to 
differentiate between functional and non-functional theories regarding error 
monitoring without having to rely on double errors. As explained in the post-
error adjustments review of Danielmeier and Ullsperger (2011) the danger of 
relying too much on double errors is that you have to be very careful the 
interpret these depending on task that was used or the absolute number of 
errors that was made. For example, in case a subject commits only 10 errors, 
every single double error leads to an increase of the post-error error rate by 
10%. Also in the task presented in Chapter 2 where we constantly updated 
the perceptual difficulty depending on the error rates, streaks of very easy 
trials were created when error rates became too high and streaks of very 
difficult trials were created when error rates became too low. Therefore, we 
should not make too strong conclusions about post-error improvements 
following the results obtained in those experiments. 
We designed a new paradigm by combining a modified Eriksen 
flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and a traditional attentional blink task 
(Chun & Potter, 1995). First, a modified speeded Eriksen flanker task that is 
known to elicit a large amount of errors is presented. The flankers were 
presented 150 ms before the target was presented very shortly for 30 ms. 
After responding on the flanker task a rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) of numbers (1 to 9) started. In 95% of the trials one letter is 
presented in the RSVP and participants have to indicate whether they did or 
did not see a letter, and if they did, which one. By using the original 
attentional blink paradigm (Chun & Potter, 1995) we were able to 
investigate the temporal dynamics of attention processes after making an 
error. In numerous studies it has been shown that when two targets are 
presented shortly after each other in a stream of non-target stimuli, it is 
harder to identify the second target (T2) when it is presented within 200 – 
500 ms after the first target. This failure to detect T2 is called the attentional 
blink effect (for a review on the attentional blink paradigm see Shapiro, 
Arnell, & Raymond, 1997 and Martens & Wyble, 2010).  
There was only a small difference between experiment 1 and 
experiment 2. Whereas immediate visual feedback was presented in 
experiment 1, this was not the case in experiment 2. Instead a blank screen 
with the same duration of the feedback signal in experiment 1 was shown. 
Both percentage misses, when the participant indicates not having seen a 
CHAPTER 7      139 
letter in the number stream, and percentage errors, when the wrong letter 
was reported, were calculated after errors and correct responses on the 
flanker task. Generally, worse performance after errors compared to after 
correct responses was shown. Relatively more targets were missed after the 
presentation of error feedback than after the presentation of correct feedback. 
In the second experiment participants not only missed the target more after 
errors, they also reported the wrong target more frequently. However, also 
on the trial preceding the error, participants missed more targets compared to 
trials preceding correct responses. This could be the result of an attentional 
dip that maybe caused the error in the first place. Taken together, our results 
indicate that post-error processes interfere with task performing processes 
immediate after the erroneous response. Both non-functional theories of 
error monitoring can explain these results. According to the bottleneck 
theory (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) error 
detection is a process that takes time and resources that interferes with the 
next task at hand. Therefore, when a target is presented shortly after making 
an error it is often missed or detected incorrectly. The orienting account 
states that poor target detection after errors is induced by an orienting 
response that has a general impact on the cognitive system. It could well be 
that when errors are followed by feedback, orienting to these infrequent 
feedback signals interfere with subsequent visual processing. Whereas in 
case that no feedback is presented, internal error processes interfere with 
subsequent target discrimination. Recent findings of an ERP study (Nahum, 
Barcellona-Lehmann, Morand, Sander, & Schnider, 2012) are in line with 
the obtained results. Nahum and colleagues found that prediction errors were 
followed by slower reaction times and higher error rates. Also the ERP-
correlate of this performance breakdown was investigated. The early visual 
component P1 had larger amplitude after unexpected outcomes than after 
expected outcomes. Both when these outcomes were unpleasant or neutral. 
They interpret their findings as evidence that unexpected prediction errors 
capture attention which leads to a decrease in performance on the subsequent 
trial. 
In an attempt to dissociate between both non-functional theories a 
third experiment was carried out. In this experiment the flanker task was 
removed. Instead two irrelevant visual stimuli were presented. The 
frequency of these stimuli matched the average accuracy in the first two 
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experiments. Half of the participants saw a red F in 60% of the trials and a 
green J in 40% of the trials. In the other half of the participants these 
frequencies were reversed. The results of this experiment were quite clear. 
The red F was followed be more target misses and more incorrectly reported 
targets, irrespective of the frequency of that red F. Based on the orienting 
account a performance breakdown after the infrequent stimulus is expected, 
irrespective of its appearance. However, in a series of achievement tasks 
Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, & Meinhardt (2007) demonstrated that 
performance was reduced after presentation of red signals. These findings 
were explained by the fact that the colour red is associated with making 
errors. For example, at school most teachers will mark errors with a red pen. 
The performance breakdown after a red F can be the consequence of error 
processes, which were triggered by the red F, that interfere with subsequent 
target detection. The fact that this effect was short-lived, at least in 
percentage misses, further supports this interpretation. The red signal might 
initiate error processing, however, no error is made and thus this process can 
immediately be aborted.  
It is clear that the orienting account for post-error slowing as it was 
originally formulated can only explain a limited set of data patterns. In the 
following paragraph we will present data that challenge the orienting 
account and move more towards a blend between the orienting account and 
the bottleneck account. 
EFFECTS OF FREQUENCY AND MAGNITUDE THAT 
CHALLENGE THE ORIENTING ACCOUNT 
In the last empirical chapter we wanted to investigate whether error 
saliency would have an impact on behavioural adjustments after an error. 
We started from two observations. First, in the experiments presented in 
Chapter 2 we found that post-error slowing was remarkably larger (23ms) 
when compared to post-oddball slowing (9ms) when keeping the infrequent 
events (errors and oddballs) even (25%). Second, in a social cognition study 
(Núñez Castellar, Notebaert, Van den Bossche, & Fias, 2011) behavioural 
adjustments after observed errors were investigated in a competitive and in a 
cooperative condition. In the competitive condition the best performing 
participant of a pair received a monetary reward, while in the cooperative 
condition the best pair of participants among all pairs received a monetary 
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reward. Post-error slowing in cooperation was twice as large as in 
competition (cooperation: 63 ms vs. competition: 32 ms). Both effects can be 
explained by a larger orienting response after more salient errors. Whereas 
an error is presumably more salient to you than irrelevant stimulus, the same 
could be said about an error that has an impact on your own score 
(cooperation) than an error that not affects your score (competition).  
To specifically test whether error significance has an impact on post-
error slowing, four between-subject conditions were created. The saliency of 
the error was manipulated by implementing different reinforcement contexts; 
two groups were punished for making an error and two groups were 
rewarded for correct responses. Note that all participants received immediate 
visual feedback on every trial. The task was a modified flanker task. Both 
groups (reward and punishment) were further subdivided in a high and low 
value group, resulting in a high and a low reward and a high and a low 
punishment group. Each group received its normal feedback on 85% of the 
cases, while receiving deviant feedback in 15% of the cases. For example, 
after correct trials, the high reward group received high reward in 85% of the 
correct trials and low reward in 15% of the correct trials, whereas the low 
reward group received low reward after correct trials in 85% and high 
reward in 15% of the cases. Both groups received error feedback after 
making an error. The same was true for the punishment groups, as the high 
punishment group received high punishment following errors in 85% of the 
cases and low punishment in 15% of the cases, and the low punishment 
group received low punishment following 85% of the error trials and high 
punishment following 15% of the errors. Again, after every correct response 
correct feedback was given. This manipulation enables us to test the effect of 
feedback frequency on subsequent performance. According to the orienting 
account more post-error slowing is expected in the punishment groups than 
in the reward groups. Because errors are made more salient by punishing 
them, while when correct responses are rewarded more attention is drawn to 
these correct responses. Besides this hypothesis, some more specific 
hypotheses were formulated. More post-error slowing is expected in het high 
punishment group than in the low punishment group. Errors should be more 
salient when they are punished more severe. Within groups larger post-error 
slowing would be expected after frequent feedback than after infrequent 
feedback. Within the reinforcement contexts we would predict larger post-
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error slowing after for example infrequent large punishment than after 
frequent small punishment. 
The obtained results were challenging for the orienting account. 
Generally, only the hypothesis about post-error slowing being larger in the 
punishment groups than in the reward groups was confirmed. There was no 
difference in post-error slowing between the high punishment group and the 
low punishment group. Also, in the low punishment group there was no 
difference after a frequent low punishment compared to after an infrequent 
high punishment. As a matter of fact, in the high reward group frequent high 
reward was followed by slower responses than infrequent low reward.  
Similarly as in the third experiment of Chapter 5, no effect, and in 
one case even a reversed effect, after infrequent events was found. Maybe 
the participants did not pay attention to the precise feedback they received 
because in the general instructions the reinforcement scheme was already 
presented. Unfortunately, we did not ask the participants whether or not they 
paid attention to the different punishment or reward signals. Although 
feedback was always given correctly, the amount of punishment or reward 
was not dependent on the sort of error that was made or the sort of trial that 
was solved correctly.  
FUNCTIONAL VS NON-FUNCTIONAL THEORIES 
Where functional theories hold that error processing and post-error 
adjustments aim to improve performance on the following trial(s), non-
functional theories explain post-error slowing in terms of reduced cognitive 
processing after errors. This dissertation started with the observation that 
traditional accounts for error-monitoring were challenged by a growing body 
of empirical data. In this dissertation we provided accumulating evidence 
that there is a need for non-functional theories for error monitoring. 
CORRELATION POST-ERROR SLOWING AND OVERALL ACCURACY 
In Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 a correlation between post-
error slowing and accuracy is reported. The most accurate participants also 
show the largest slowing after errors compared to after correct responses. It 
is undeniable that post-error slowing is at least partly influenced by error 
frequency. From a functional theory perspective one could say that better 
cognitive functioning participants, according to their high accuracy rates, 
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apply more cognitive control and as a result show larger post-error slowing. 
However, in a study of Steinborn and colleagues (2012) post-error slowing 
and post-error accuracy changes was reported in a group of participants with 
a small range of accuracy, from 94% to 99%. When classifying participants 
into three groups according to their accuracy, it was shown that post-error 
slowing was largest in the high accurate group and smallest in the low 
accurate group. The group with the highest accuracy had also the lowest 
accuracy rates after errors compared to after correct trials. This would not be 
expected when post-error slowing is interpreted as a cognitive control effect, 
a remedial action in order to perform better. When post-error slowing is seen 
as the result of an orienting response, increased error rates are expected as 
you are more startled by the infrequent error you made. The bottleneck 
theory, however, needs an additional assumption to explain this finding. As 
Steinborn and colleagues suggested this assumption could be that infrequent 
errors lead to a longer post-error refractory period than frequent errors. 
Another explanation that combines both non-functional theories is that an 
orienting response to the infrequent nature of the error is the source of the 
interference that causes the bottleneck in central processing when another 
task needs to be processed immediately afterwards. The size of this orienting 
response depends on the relative frequency. 
In a study by Maylor and Rabbitt (1995), participants were divided 
into two groups depending on their IQ rates. Although there was no 
difference in mean accuracy between both groups, the group with lowest IQ 
rates demonstrated the largest post-error slowing. This also contradicts an 
explanation in terms of high functioning participants that call for more 
cognitive control. The orienting account can only explain the result of 
Maylor and Rabbitt by assuming that people with lower IQ rates are more 
startled by surprising events than people with higher IQ rates. The bottleneck 
theory has a more elegant way of explaining the results. People with lower 
IQ rates have presumably lower capacity of working memory which results a 
lower ability to do two things at the same time. 
POST-ERROR PERFORMANCE 
In all the empirical chapters post-error slowing was accompanied by 
post-error accuracy decrease. The use of double errors in order to dissociate 
between a functional explanation for post-error slowing and a non-functional 
144      GENERAL DISCUSSION 
explanation is, however, questionable (see above). When using the 
attentional blink task (Chun & Potter, 1995) to measure post-error 
performance much stronger evidence is established.  
Recent fMRI studies (King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010; 
Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011) that 
investigated the relation between posterior medial frontal cortex activity and 
post-error behaviour observed a relationship between post-error slowing and 
decreased motor activation. Although this could be interpreted in terms of a 
motor inhibition account (Danielmeier et al.), it is also possible that the 
distraction on the basis of the infrequent error results in decreased motor 
activation.  
An important remark to make is that in most tasks used in error 
monitoring research there is not much that can be learned. The tasks are 
mostly quite easy to do. For example, pressing a right button when you see 
an arrow pointing to the right and a left button when you see an arrow 
pointing to the left is not that difficult to remember. The speed of the task, 
both the speeded presentation of the stimuli and the short response deadline, 
evoke many errors. A challenge for future research therefore is to come up 
with experiments where errors induce either an orienting response or a real 
strategic adjustment of behaviour in order to perform better.  
This idea is nicely illustrated in an ERP study (Holroyd, Krigolson, 
Baker, Lee, & Gibson, 2009) that further investigated the domain of the 
reinforcement learning theory originally described by Holroyd and Coles 
(2002). The study started from the observation that the basic hypothesis 
made by this theory was not always confirmed. According to this theory 
dopaminergic reinforcement signals are used by the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) for selecting and reinforcing the motor controllers to perform the 
ongoing task optimally. The reinforcement learning theory states that the 
impact of these dopamine signals on the ACC modulate the amplitude of the 
ERN. Thus the more unexpected an event is, the larger the amplitude of the 
ERN should be. When investigating under which circumstances this 
hypothesis was confirmed the researchers found that this was most 
convincingly the case when optimal behavior is learnable. Similarly, in an 
experiment of Desmet, Imbo, De Brauwer, Brass, Fias, & Notebaert (2012) 
participants had to solve multiplications. This enabled participants to apply a 
more variety of strategic adjustments than only paying more attention to the 
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presented stimulus, which is usually the case in conflict tasks. It was 
demonstrated that performance improves after errors when it is possible to 
learn something after errors. 
In my view it is therefore necessary to move more towards 
experiments that enable the participant to learn to perform better.  
TOWARDS A UNIFIED VIEW ON ERROR MONITORING 
Functional theories and non-functional theories do not need to be 
mutually exclusive. It could well be that the immediate reaction to an error is 
for a large part dependent on its frequency. The following orienting response 
in case of an infrequent error will cause interference in the central processor 
when a subsequent task is followed immediately. However, when there is 
time enough both processes post-error slowing can in fact be used as a 
remedial action in order to perform better. In a study by Jentzsch and 
Dudschig (2009) smaller post-error slowing was found in a condition with 
long intervals (1000ms) between the response of the previous trial and the 
stimulus of the next trial (referred to as the Response Stimulus Interval: RSI) 
than in a condition with short intervals (100ms). There was, however, still 
post-error slowing in both conditions. Interestingly, post-error performance 
improved slightly in the longer RSI condition compared to in the short RSI 
condition. In that same experiment an underadditive effect of perceptual 
difficulty and post-error slowing was found. Previously, it had been 
demonstrated that perceptual processes can be carried out in parallel to 
central processes (Jentzsch, Leuthold, & Ulrich, 2007). On short RSIs no 
effect of perceptual difficulty was found on post-error trials, while this effect 
was present in post-correct trials. This underadditivity effect disappeared in 
case of long RSIs and was accompanied by better performance after errors. 
This can be explained by the fact that error monitoring processes have been 
completed, leaving time for strategic behavioural adjustments that lead to 
slower and more accuracy responses. This can be done by for example 
inhibiting the motor system in the brain. Thus, the time available after an 
error is probably an important prerequisite to observe functional results of 
post-error slowing. 
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HOOFDSTUK 8 
SAMENVATTING VAN HET PROEFSCHRIFT:  
FOUTENMONITORING: EVIDENTIE VOOR EEN  
VERKLARING IN TERMEN VAN ORIËNTATIE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Een geniaal persoon maakt geen vergissingen. 
Zijn fouten zijn gewild en zijn de poorten der ontdekking” 
 
Ullysses (1922), James Joyce (1882-1941) 
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FOUTEN EN DE REACTIE OP FOUTEN 
Fouten maken is een essentieel onderdeel van het leven. Iedereen 
maakt fouten. Veel belangrijker dan het maken van een fout op zich is de 
manier waarop je erop reageert. Je kan erover piekeren dat je de fout 
gemaakt hebt en daardoor niet onderzoeken hoe die fout er gekomen is en 
hoe je ze in de toekomst kan vermijden. Je kan de fout ook zien als een 
opportuniteit om huidige werkmethoden in vraag te stellen. Dit is ook wat ze 
volgens een legende over ‘ivory soap’ bij Proctor en Gamble deden eind de 
19
de
 eeuw. Toen één van de werknemers op een dag lunchpauze hield, vergat 
hij de machine die de zeep mixte af te zetten. Op het moment dat hij terug 
kwam was de zeep extra luchtig geworden door de lucht die er onder gemixt 
was. In plaats van de fout gemixte zeep weg te gooien, besloten ze om het 
mengsel te houden en de zeep te verkopen. Hun drijvende zeep werd een 
bestseller die wereldwijd verkocht werd. Hoewel onderzoek bij Proctor en 
Gamble heeft uitgewezen dat de drijvende zeep een uitvinding was van één 
van hun chemici, blijft de legende toch een goede illustratie van hoe de 
reactie op een fout veel belangrijker is dan de fout op zich. 
Tabel 3. Citaten over fouten van oude filosofen. 
Venia dignus error est humanus 
Titus Livius (59 BC - AD 17) 
Humanum fuit errare, diabolicum est per animositatem in errore 
manere 
Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354 – 430) 
Errare humanum est, perseverare 
autem diabolicum, et tertium non datur 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 4 BC – AD 65) 
Cuiusvis errare:insipientis nullius nisi, in errore perseverare 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC - 43 BC) 
In Table 1 zijn enkele citaten gepresenteerd van filosofen van soms 
meer dan 2000 jaar geleden. Opvallend bij deze citaten is dat ze ook meer 
gericht zijn op hoe er gereageerd wordt op een fout dan het maken van een 
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fout op zich. De algemene boodschap van deze citaten is dat fouten maken 
menselijk is, maar dat volharden in je fouten duivels is. 
In dit proefschrift wordt eerder de reactie op een fout onderzocht, 
dan de modaliteiten van het fouten maken op zich. Eind de jaren 60 
onderzochten cognitief psychologen Rabbitt en Laming het gedrag na 
fouten. Beiden vonden de sindsdien vaak gerepliceerde bevinding dat 
mensen vertragen na het maken van een fout (Rabbitt, 1966; Laming, 1968). 
Deze vertraging werd oorspronkelijk aanzien als een strategische vertraging 
met als doel beter te presteren op de volgende oefening. Zulke verklaring 
noemt men een functionele verklaring van vertragen na fouten. De 
vertraging zelf heeft namelijk een functie. Hoewel betere prestaties na het 
maken van een fout af en toe zijn gerapporteerd (Laming, 1968; Marco-
Pallares, Camara, Munte, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008; Maier, Yeung, & 
Steinhauser, 2011), was dit zeker niet altijd het geval. Verschillende studies 
rapporteren slechtere prestaties na fouten terwijl op hetzelfde moment 
vertraagd werd (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2009; Steinborn, Flehmig, Bratzke, & Schröter, 2012). Deze bevindingen 
waren de eerste aanleiding voor dit proefschrift. Het lijkt alsof de vertraging 
na een fout niet altijd functioneel is, maar soms ook zorgt voor een 
verstoring van de processen die nodig zijn om de volgende oefening op te 
lossen. 
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Figuur 3. Twee voorbeelden van eenvoudige conflicttaken die in het 
laboratorium vaak gebruikt worden om fouten te onderzoeken. 
Om fouten te onderzoeken gebruikt men in het laboratorium 
eenvoudige conflicttaken. In Figuur 3 worden twee voorbeelden van zulke 
conflicttaken gegeven. Ten eerste is er de Flanker taak (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974) waarbij je moet reageren op de richting van de middelste pijl. Deze 
middelste pijl wordt geflankeerd door vier andere pijlen. Deze kunnen in 
dezelfde richting wijzen of in de omgekeerde richting. In het eerste geval 
spreken we van een compatibele oefening waarbij de flankers compatibel 
zijn met het correcte antwoord. In het tweede geval spreken we van een 
incompatibele oefening waarbij de flankers niet compatibel zijn met de 
correcte response. Meestal zullen deelnemers aan zulke experimenten vooral 
fouten maken wanneer ze incompatibele oefeningen moeten oplossen. 
De ‘conflict monitoring theory’ (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) is een functionele theorie 
die stelt dat er een signaal gestuurd wordt naar een conflict monitor wanneer 
er conflict in ons cognitief systeem opgemerkt wordt. Deze monitor zal er 
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dan voor zorgen dat de cognitieve controle verhoogd wordt. Wanneer men 
een fout maakt gaat dit meestal gepaard met conflict. Zowel de correcte (niet 
uitgevoerde) respons zal actief zijn als de foute (uitgevoerde) respons. Het 
op hetzelfde moment actief zijn van beide antwoorden zorgt voor conflict. 
Verhoogde cognitieve controle zal ervoor zorgen dat men trager en ook beter 
presteert op de volgende oefening. De ‘reinforcement learning’ theorie 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002) stelt dat leersignalen onder de vorm van dopamine 
door de anterieure cingulate cortex opgewekt worden wanneer 
gebeurtenissen afwijken van wat verwacht wordt. Deze signalen worden 
gebruikt om de gebieden die zorgen voor beweging perfect af te stellen op de 
taak die men aan het doen is. Verder stelt men dat de impact van deze 
dopamine-signalen op de ACC de grootte van de ERN (een error-specifiek 
potentiaal) beïnvloeden. Hoe meer onverwachts een gebeurtenis is, hoe 
groter de ERN zou moeten zijn. Een niet-functionele theorie die ongeveer 
tegelijkertijd met onze verklaring ontwikkeld werd is de flessenhals theorie 
voor foutenmonitoring van Jentzsch en Dudschig (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 
2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009). Deze theorie stelt dat de centrale 
verwerker in ons brein een gelimiteerde capaciteit heeft. Wanneer men een 
fout maakt zijn er aan die fout gerelateerde processen bezig die ook door 
deze centrale processor verwerkt moeten worden. Indien een volgende 
oefening te snel volgt na het maken van een fout dan treedt er interferentie 
op. Bijgevolg zal de volgende oefening trager verwerkt worden en treedt er 
vertraging na fouten op. Deze theorie verwacht ook dat men, indien 
oefeningen elkaar in sneltempo opvolgen, slechter zal presteren na een fout 
dan na een juiste oefening. Indien er echter voldoende tijd is, verwacht men 
dat strategische aanpassingen aan het gedrag kunnen gedaan worden om 
beter te presteren op de volgende oefening. 
EEN VERKLARING IN TERMEN VAN ORIËNTATIE 
Vanuit de observatie dat vertraging na fouten niet altijd resulteert in 
betere prestaties zochten we naar een alternatieve verklaring voor deze 
vertraging. Wanneer men nagaat hoe vaak een fout wordt gemaakt in de 
eenvoudige taken in het laboratorium dan valt het op dat dit aantal relatief 
laag is. We trokken de parallel met een onverwachte gebeurtenis. Wanneer 
in je omgeving iets onverwachts gebeurt dan wordt je aandacht ernaar 
getrokken en moet je je terug re-oriënteren naar wat je op dat moment aan 
het doen was. Deze oriëntatie reflex werd al in 1863 beschreven door 
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Sechenov. Later is deze reflex veelvuldig onderzocht door toonaangevende 
wetenschappers (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963). Onze hypothese is dat de 
vertraging die men gewoonlijk vindt in het laboratorium na fouten beïnvloed 
wordt door het aantal keren dat die fout is voorgekomen. Wanneer men heel 
weinig fouten maakt, verwacht men volgens deze hypothese dat de 
vertraging na een fout groter is dan wanneer men vaak fouten maakt. Om dit 
te onderzoeken ontworpen we een taak waarin het aantal fouten 
gemanipuleerd werd. Onze deelnemers moesten kleuren categoriseren. Dit 
betekent dat ze een bepaalde knop moesten indrukken al naargelang ze een 
groen, geel, blauw of rood vierkant zagen verschijnen. Om de taak 
moeilijker te maken werd de donkerte van de kleur aangepast. Er waren drie 
condities die alle deelnemers deden, een 35% correctheid, een 55% 
correctheid en een 75% correctheid conditie. Wanneer je bijvoorbeeld in de 
55% correctheid conditie zat, dan werd er na elk antwoord op een oefening 
gekeken naar de gemiddelde nauwkeurigheid op de voorbije 20 oefeningen. 
Wanneer je meer dan 9 fouten had gemaakt dan werd de kleur lichter en dus 
gemakkelijker om te categoriseren. Wanneer je minder dan 9 fouten had 
gemaakt werd de kleur donkerder en bij gevolg moeilijker om te 
categoriseren. Bij 9 fouten bleef de kleur gelijk. 
In lijn met onze verwachtingen vonden we inderdaad dat de 
vertraging na fouten in de 75% conditie het grootst was. In de 55% conditie 
was er geen vertraging na fouten. In de 35% conditie echter waren reacties 
na een correct antwoord trager dan na een fout antwoord. Dit is ook wat men 
op basis van een verklaring in termen van oriëntatie zou verwachten. 
Wanneer correct antwoorden een onverwachte gebeurtenis wordt, dan zou je 
inderdaad verwachten dat dit een oriëntatie reflex uitlokt waardoor je trager 
bent op de volgende oefening.  
In een tweede experiment bleven de kleuren constant, maar nu werd 
er telkens ook een hoge of een lage toon gepresenteerd. De ene groep hoorde 
een hoge toon in 75% van de oefeningen en een lage toon in 35% van de 
oefeningen. De andere groep kreeg het omgekeerde te horen. Belangrijk in 
dit experiment is dat deze toon totaal irrelevant was voor de deelnemers. 
Ook nu vonden we dat reacties na een niet vaak voorkomende toon (25%) 
trager waren dan na het horen van de andere toon. Dit demonstreert het 
algemene effect dat een onverwachte gebeurtenis een vertraging uitlokt.  
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In het eerste experiment kregen deelnemers steeds onmiddellijke 
feedback na het geven van een antwoord. Wanneer ze fout waren werd er 
een F gepresenteerd op het scherm, wanneer ze juist waren werd er een J 
gepresenteerd en wanneer het antwoord te traag geven werd dan verscheen 
er een T. Het is dus mogelijk dat de oriëntatie reflex die we beschreven 
eigenlijk veroorzaakt werd door het zien van een onverwachtse visuele 
presentatie van de feedback en niet door het onverwachts maken van een 
fout of geven van een juist antwoord. In het volgende hoofdstuk wordt een 
experiment voorgesteld waarin we dit meer in detail onderzoeken. 
ORIËNTATIE NAAR FOUTEN MET EN ZONDER 
ONMIDDELLIJKE FEEDBACK 
Een voorbeeld om te illustreren wat fouten met en zonder externe 
feedback zijn is het volgende. Beeld je in dat je op de trein zit en plots merkt 
dat je eindstation bereikt is. In al je haast zoek je je spullen samen en 
vervolgens begeef je je naar de uitgang van de wagon. Je hebt echter je sjaal 
laten liggen op je zitplaats. Het kan zijn dat een vriendelijke medepassagier 
zegt: “Hee, je bent je sjaal vergeten!”. Het kan ook gebeuren dat je terwijl je 
je naar de uitgang begeeft beseft dat je je sjaal vergeten bent, en uit jezelf 
terug keert om je sjaal te halen. In het eerste voorbeeld was er een extern 
signaal, komende van de medepassagier, dat je wees op je fout. In het 
tweede voorbeeld heb je zelf ontdekt dat je fout was. In hoofdstuk 3 
onderzochten we de hypothesen van de verklaring in termen van oriëntatie 
wanneer er geen externe feedback gegeven wordt en deelnemers dus op 
zichzelf aangewezen zijn om te ontdekken dat ze fout waren. We verwachten 
dat de mate van onverwachts zijn van de intern ontdekte fout de grootte van 
de oriëntatie reflex zal bepalen en dus dat vertragingen na fouten ook hier 
afhankelijk zullen zijn van de onverwachtsheid van de fout.  
We gebruikten hetzelfde paradigma als in hoofdstuk 2 met enkele 
belangrijke wijzingen. Het adaptief algoritme werd slechts in het begin van 
elke conditie gebruikt om te bepalen voor elke deelnemer afzonderlijk welke 
donkerte nodig was om het vooraf bepaalde percentage fouten binnen die 
specifieke conditie te maken. Ook de condities waren lichtjes anders, in dit 
experiment werd er gestreefd naar 50% nauwkeurigheid, 70% 
nauwkeurigheid en 90% nauwkeurigheid. De helft van de deelnemers kreeg 
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onmiddellijke feedback en de andere helft kreeg slechts na elke 50
ste
 
oefening feedback. 
De resultaten waren conform de hypothese. Er werd het meest 
vertraagd na fouten in de 90% conditie, minder in de 70% conditie en er was 
geen vertraging meer in de 50% conditie. Dit effect van de frequentie van de 
fout op het vertragen na fouten was niet afhankelijk van onmiddellijke 
feedback. In beide groepen werd hetzelfde resultaat gevonden. 
DE PE ALS EEN INDEX VAN INTERNE ORIËNTATIE NAAR 
FOUTEN 
In een studie gedaan door onze onderzoeksgroep werden de 
elektrofysiologische correlaten van onverwachte fouten en onverwachte 
juiste antwoorden onderzocht (Nùñez-Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & Notebaert, 
2010). Ze gebruikten dezelfde taak als die beschreven in hoofdstuk 2. De 
gedragsmatige bevindingen werden gerepliceerd. In de 75% nauwkeurigheid 
conditie vertraagden de deelnemers na fouten en in de 35% nauwkeurigheid 
conditie vertraagde men na het geven van een juist antwoord. Nùñez-
Castellar en collega’s vonden dat de P3, een aan aandacht gerelateerde ERP 
component, correleerde met de vertragingen. De P3 is een ERP component 
die gerelateerd is aan opvallende gebeurtenissen. De P3 was het sterkst na 
feedback die aangeeft dat je fout was in de 75% conditie en het sterkst na 
feedback die aangeeft dat je juist antwoordde in de 25% conditie. De ERN, 
een ERP component die gerelateerd is aan fouten, correleerde echter niet met 
reactietijden. In hoofdstuk 4 willen we gedragsmatige veranderingen na 
fouten correleren met ERP componenten.  
In onze taak werd geen feedback gegeven. We creëerden een 
moeilijke en een makkelijke conditie van een flanker taak. De resultaten van 
deze studie waren niet helemaal volgens de verwachtingen. Ookal was er een 
verschil in het percentage fouten tussen beide condities, toch was er geen 
verschil in de vertraging na fouten. Wanneer we de data per conditie 
afzonderlijk gaan analyseren vonden we wel een correlatie tussen het 
percentage fouten en vertraging na fouten. De foutgerelateerde ERP 
componenten die we onderzochten waren de ERN en de PE. De ERN is een 
negatieve potentiaal die tussen 0 en 100 ms na het maken van een fout 
gemeten kan worden. De PE is een positieve potentiaal die tussen 200 en 
400 ms na fout geobserveerd wordt. Zowel de ERN als de PE was het grootst 
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in de conditie waar het minst fouten werd gemaakt, zoals al in een eerder 
ERP studie gevonden werd (Santesso, Segalowitz, & Schmidt, 2006). 
De correlatie tussen de ERP data en de gedragsmatige veranderingen 
na fouten toonde aan dat enkel de PE correleerde met het vertragen na 
fouten. In verschillende ERP studies is het reeds aangetoond dat de PE en de 
P3 zeer gelijkaardige componenten zijn. De PE kan dus gezien worden als 
een marker voor interne oriëntatie naar fouten. 
VERBLIND WORDEN DOOR EEN FOUT 
Om te onderzoeken of vertraging na fouten gepaard gaat met betere 
prestaties wordt vaak gekeken naar het percentage fouten dat na een fout 
gemaakt wordt en het percentage fouten dat na een correct antwoord 
gemaakt wordt. Deze methode is sterk afhankelijk van zowel dubbele fouten 
als het aantal fouten dat gemaakt werd. In een overzichtsartikel van 
Danielmeier en Ullsperger (2011) kaartte men dit probleem reeds aan. 
Wanneer bijvoorbeeld iemand slechts 10 fouten heeft gemaakt tijdens het 
experiment dan zorgt elke dubbele fout voor een verhoging van 10% in het 
percentage fouten na fouten. We zochten dus een nieuwe manier om 
prestaties na fouten te gaan evalueren. Een reeds vaak gebruikt paradigma in 
aandachtsonderzoek is het “attentional blink” paradigma (Chun & Potter, 
1995). Bij zulke experiment gaat men een heel snelle stroom van 
bijvoorbeeld cijfers presenteren. In die stroom van cijfers worden twee 
letters getoond. De taak van de deelnemer is om die twee letters te 
identificeren. Indien deze letters kort na elkaar getoond worden dan is het 
zeer moeilijk om de tweede letter in de rij te detecteren. We pasten dit 
paradigma aan door een flanker taak direct te laten volgend door zo een 
stroom van cijfers. Deelnemers reageren eerst op de flanker taak en meteen 
erna moeten ze een letter in een cijferstroom detecteren. In het eerste 
experiment werd er tussen de flanker taak en de cijferstroom ook een visueel 
feedback signaal gepresenteerd, in het tweede experiment werd dit 
vervangen door een leeg scherm. Op die manier bleef de timing in beide 
experimenten hetzelfde. We vonden dat een fout op de flanker taak vaker 
gevolgd werd door een fout in de detectie taak dan een correct antwoord op 
de flanker taak. Dus na het maken van een fout is er een dip in aandacht. Dit 
werd zowel gevonden met als zonder feedback.  
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Dit kan zowel verklaard worden door de flessenhals theorie voor 
foutenmonitoring (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009; Dudschig & Jentzsch, 2009) 
als door de verklaring in termen van oriëntatie. Het kan zowel zijn dat de 
aandachtsdip veroorzaakt wordt doordat er teveel processen tegelijk 
plaatsvinden als dat de onverwachtsheid van de fout een oriëntatie reflex 
uitlokt die vervolgens de aandacht verstoort. 
Om een onderscheid te maken tussen beide niet-functionele 
verklaringen voor vertraging na fouten werd een derde experiment 
ontworpen. De flanker taak werd achterwege gelaten en elke stroom van 
cijfers begon nu met een rode F of een groene J. Dit waren de zelfde letters 
als de feedbacksignalen in het eerste experiment. De deelnemers werden in 
twee groepen verdeeld en kregen een verschillend percentage van beide 
letters. De ene groep zag de rode F in 60% van de oefeningen en bijgevolg 
de groene J in 40% van de oefeningen. De andere groep zag de groene J het 
vaakst (60%) en de rode F het minst (40%). Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, 
en Meinhardt (2007) toonden reeds aan dat rode signalen gerelateerd worden 
met fouten. Op basis van deze kennis zou de flessenhals theorie voor 
foutenmonitoring verwachten dat de aandachtsdip afhankelijk zal zijn van 
het voorkomen van de rode F onafhankelijk van de frequentie waarmee die 
letter getoond wordt. De verklaring in termen van oriëntatie zou voorspellen 
dat de aandachtsdip het grootst zal zijn na de letter die het minst vaak 
voorkwam, onafhankelijk van het uitzicht van de letter. 
Er werd evidentie gevonden voor de flessenhals theorie. De 
aandachtsdip was in beide groepen het grootst na het zien van een rode F, 
onafhankelijk van de frequentie van die stimulus.  
EFFECTEN VAN DE FREQUENTIE EN GROOTTE VAN STRAF 
EN BELONING: EEN UITDAGING VOOR EEN VERKLARING IN 
TERMEN VAN ORIËNTATIE 
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzochten we ten slotte of de salientie van een 
fout gedragsmatige aanpassingen na fouten zou beïnvloeden. Een 
gebeurtenis kan niet vaak voorkomen en dus onverwachts zijn, maar als die 
helemaal onopvallend gebeurt dan zal je ze ook niet opmerken. Verder is het 
bekend dat de salientie van een gebeurtenis ook een invloed heeft op de 
oriëntatie reflex die het eventueel uitlokt (Bernstein, Scheffers, & Coles, 
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1995). Het startpunt van dit onderzoek was tweezijdig. Ten eerste vonden we 
in het tweede experiment van hoofdstuk 2 dat de deelnemers opvallend 
meer vertraagden na fouten (23 ms) dan na een onverwachte stimulus (9 ms), 
zelfs indien de frequentie van voorkomen gelijk gehouden werd. Ten tweede 
hadden Nùñez-Castellar, Notebaert, Van den Bossche, en Fias (2011) 
gevonden dat de invloed die het observeren van een fout had op het eigen 
gedrag afhankelijk was van de context waarin men zich bevond. Er was een 
coöperatieve en een competitieve conditie. In de eerste conditie werd aan de 
deelnemers verteld dat het koppel met gezamenlijk het minste aantal fouten 
een extra beloning zou krijgen. In de competitieve conditie werd per koppel 
de best presterende deelnemer beloond. In de coöperatieve conditie 
vertraagde men twee keer zo lang als in de competitieve conditie na het zien 
van een fout bij de andere deelnemer (coöperatief: 63 ms vs. competitief: 32 
ms).  Een fout bij de andere deelnemer in een coöperatieve conditie is 
waarschijnlijk meer salient, meer belangrijk voor jou dan in een 
competitieve conditie waar de fout geen invloed heeft op jouw eigen score. 
Om de salientie van de fout te manipuleren hebben we vier condities 
gecreëerd waarin telkens andere deelnemers deelnamen. Twee groepen 
werden gestraft na het maken van fout door punten te verliezen (de 
deelnemer met het grootst aantal overgebleven punten werd extra beloond) 
en twee groepen werden beloond voor het geven van juiste antwoorden door 
hen punten toe te kennen (de deelnemer met het grootst aantal verworven 
punten werd beloond). De taak was een moeilijkere versie van de flanker 
taak waarbij de flankers eerst getoond werden en de target pas later. De 
strafgroepen en de beloningsgroepen werden verder opgedeeld in een groep 
die meestal veel straf/beloning en soms weinig straf/beloning kreeg en een 
groep die meestal weinig straf/beloning kreeg en soms veel straf/beloning 
kreeg. Op deze manier konden we het effect van de frequentie van de 
feedback op het gedrag testen. Volgens de verklaring in termen van 
oriëntatie verwacht men meer vertraging na fouten in de strafgroepen dan in 
de beloningsgroepen. Aangezien men zou kunnen verwachten dat fouten 
meer opvallend/salient gemaakt worden door deelnemers te bestraffen bij het 
maken van een fout, terwijl correcte antwoorden meer aandacht krijgen 
wanneer je beloond wordt voor het geven van een juist antwoord. Verder 
verwachtten we ook meer vertraging na fouten in de groep die meestal veel 
straf krijgt dan in de groep die meestal weinig straf krijgt. Aangezien fouten 
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hoogstwaarschijnlijk salienter zijn wanneer ze meer bestraft worden. Bij 
analyses binnen de groepen verwachtten we dat vertraging na fouten groter 
is na feedback die vaak gegeven wordt, dan na feedback die slechts af en toe 
gegeven wordt. 
De resultaten vormden een uitdaging voor de verklaring in termen 
van oriëntatie. Enkel de hypothese dat mensen meer zouden vertragen na 
fouten in een straf conditie dan in een beloning conditie werd bevestigd. Er 
was geen verschil in vertraging na fouten in de groep die meestal veel 
bestraft werd en de groep die meestal weinig bestraft werd. Daarenboven 
vonden we in de omgekeerde effecten in de groep die vaak veel beloond 
werd.  
Net als in het derde experiment van hoofdstuk 5 vonden we geen 
effect en zelfs een omgekeerd effect na infrequente gebeurtenissen. Het is 
mogelijk dat de deelnemers geen aandacht gaven aan de exacte feedback die 
ze kregen aangezien ze al in het begin van het experiment op de hoogte 
waren gesteld van het feit dat ze straf/zouden krijgen. Jammer genoeg 
hebben we de deelnemers niet gevraagd of ze aandacht gegeven hebben aan 
het precieze feedback signaal.  
FUNCTIONELE THEORIEËN VERSUS NIET-FUNCTIONELE 
THEORIEËN 
Functionele theorieën voor het vertragen na fouten veronderstellen 
dat foutenmonitoring en gedragsmatige aanpassingen na het maken van een 
fout er op gericht zijn om de prestatie in de volgende oefeningen te 
verbeteren. Niet-functionele theorieën verklaren het vertragen na fouten aan 
de hand van verminderde cognitieve processen. Dit proefschrift begon bij de 
observatie dat het vertragen na fouten niet altijd gepaard gaat met een 
verbetering in prestaties. Ook werd aangetoond dat patiënten met schade aan 
hun frontale kwab, in gebieden die voor functionele theorieën essentieel zijn 
voor het strategisch aanpassen van het gedrag na fouten, nog steeds 
vertraging na fouten vertonen (Stemmer, Segalowitz, Witzke, & Schönle, 
2004).  
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DE SAMENHANG TUSSEN VERTRAGEN NA FOUTEN EN ALGEMENE 
ACCURAATHEID 
In hoofdstuk 3, hoofdstuk 4 en hoofdstuk 4 werd een positieve 
correlatie tussen het aantal correcte antwoorden in een experiment en de 
mate van vertraging na fouten aangetoond. Mensen die het best presteren, 
vertragen ook het meest na het maken van een fout. Deze bevinding maakt 
het onweerlegbaar dat het vertragen na fouten op zijn minst gedeeltelijk 
beïnvloed is door het aantal fouten dat gemaakt wordt. Een functionele 
verklaring voor deze bevinding zou kunnen zijn dat mensen die cognitief 
zeer goed functioneren en bijgevolg zeer weinig fouten maken, meer 
strategische controle aan de dag kunnen leggen. Met als gevolg dat ze ook 
meer gaan vertragen. Enkele bevindingen spreken deze verklaring tegen. 
Steinborn en collega’s (2012) onderzochten reactietijden en accuraatheden 
na het maken van fouten in een groep van zeer goed scorende mensen. De 
gemiddelde accuraatheid ging van 94% tot 99%. De deelnemers werden in 
drie groepen ingedeeld, afhankelijk van hun percentage correcte antwoorden 
zaten ze in de minst presenterende groep, de best presenterende groep en de 
groep die daar tussenin valt. De best presterende groep vertoonde de grootste 
vertraging na het maken van een fout. De minst presenterende groep 
vertraagde het minst. Het was opmerkelijk dat de best scorende groep het 
slechtst scoorde na het maken van een fout. Deze samenhang van grootste 
vertraging en slechtst presteren zou je niet verwachten indien vertraging na 
fouten steeds tot doel heeft om beter te presteren. Een verklaring in termen 
van oriëntatie zou inderdaad voorspellen dat prestaties na een fout slechtst 
zijn in de groep waar het minst fouten voor komen, aangezien zij het meest 
verrast zijn van hun onverwachte fout. De flessenhals theorie zou deze 
bevindingen enkel kunnen verklaring indien ze de assumptie dat minder 
frequente fouten leiden tot een langere periode van interferentie. Een andere 
verklaring, die beide niet-functionele theorieën combineert, is dat 
onverwachtse fouten een oriëntatie reflex uitlokken en dat dit de bron is van 
de interferentie die de opstopping in de flessenhals veroorzaakt. De grootte 
van deze oriëntatie reflex hangt af van de relatieve frequentie van de fout. 
In een onderzoek uitgevoerd door Maylor en Rabbitt (1995) deelde 
men deelnemers op in twee groepen afhankelijk van hun score op een IQ 
test. Hoewel er geen verschil tussen beide groepen was in het aantal fouten 
dat gemaakt werd, toch vertraagden de deelnemers in de groep met de 
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laagste IQ scores meer na een fout dan de groep met de hoogste IQ scores. 
Deze bevinding doet opnieuw twijfelen aan een verklaring op basis van 
cognitief sterk presterende mensen die een grotere strategische controle over 
hun antwoorden hebben. De meest elegante verklaring van de bevindingen 
van Maylor en Rabbitt is die van de flessenhals theorie. Mensen met een 
lagere IQ score hebben waarschijnlijk ook een minder groot werkgeheugen 
waardoor ze slechter zijn in het uitvoeren van meerdere processen tegelijk.  
PRESTATIES NA HET MAKEN VAN EEN FOUT 
In elk empirisch hoofdstuk in dit proefschrift ging vertragen na een 
fout samen met een hogere fouten ratio na een fout dan na een juist 
antwoord. Het gebruik van dubbele fouten om een verschil te maken tussen 
functionele en niet-functionele theorieën werd reeds eerder in twijfel 
getrokken. Door de implementatie van de ‘attentional blink’ taak (Chun & 
Potter, 1995) hebben we veel overtuigender kunnen aantonen dat de 
aandacht na een fout in typische taken in het lab verstoord is.  
Recente fMRI studies (King, Korb, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 
2010; Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011) 
onderzochten de relatie tussen hersenactiviteit in de posterieure mediale 
frontale cortex en het gedrag na het maken van een fout. Deze studies 
toonden aan dat de foutspecifieke vertraging gepaard ging met een 
vermindering van hersenactiviteit in het gebied dat instaat voor onze 
bewegingen. Men zou kunnen stellen dat de afleiding die gebeurt door het 
maken van een onverwachte fout resulteert in een vermindering van 
hersenactiviteit in het bewegingsgebied. 
Een belangrijke opmerking bij de meeste taken die gebruikt worden 
om de processen die gepaard gaan met het maken van fouten te onderzoeken, 
is dat er meestal niet zo heel veel kan geleerd worden. Wanneer je 
verkeerdelijk de rechtse knop indrukte wanneer op het midden van het 
scherm een pijl naar links gepresenteerd werd kan je eigenlijk enkel maar 
proberen om je beter te concentreren in de volgende oefening. Het 
veelvuldig gebruik van zulke taken kan de theorievorming van cognitieve 
processen beïnvloeden. Het is belangrijk om ook na te gaan of dezelfde 
resultaten gevonden worden wanneer een meer ecologische valide taak 
gebruikt wordt. 
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Dit wordt mooi geïllustreerd in een onderzoek van Desmet, Imbo, 
De Brauwer, Brass, Fias en Notebaert (2012). De deelnemers moesten 
vermenigvuldigingen oplossen. Dit gaf hen de kans om een meer dan een 
strategie te kunnen gebruiken om beter te presteren op de volgende oefening. 
In deze taak vond men dat deelnemers beter presteren na het maken van een 
fout. 
In een ERP-studie van Holroyd, Krigolson, Baker, Lee, en Gibson 
(2009) werd ongeveer hetzelfde punt gemaakt. In deze studie wilde men het 
domein waarin de ‘reinforcement learning theory’ van Holroyd en Coles 
(2002) gaan onderzoeken. In eerder onderzoek was immers aangetoond dat 
hun theorie niet altijd bevestigd werd. De onderzoekers vonden dat hun 
hypotheses het meest overtuigend bevestigd werden wanneer men kan leren 
om optimaal te reageren op de taak. 
Een uitdaging voor toekomstig onderzoek is dus om experimenten te 
ontwerpen waarbij fouten ofwel een oriëntatie reflex uitlokken ofwel een 
werkelijke strategische verandering in het gedrag. Experimenten die een 
grotere ecologische validiteit hebben. 
NAAR EEN GEÜNIFICEERD BEELD VAN FOUTENMONITORING 
Functionele en niet-functionele verklaringen voor vertragen na 
fouten hoeven elkaar niet uit te sluiten. Het zou zeer goed kunnen dat de 
onmiddellijke reactie na het maken van een fout voor een groot deel bepaald 
wordt door het relatieve aantal fouten dat gemaakt werd. De oriëntatie reflex 
die dan zou volgen op een weinig voorkomende fout kan dan interferentie 
veroorzaken in de centrale verwerker wanneer onmiddellijk daaropvolgend 
een taak moet gedaan worden. Maar indien er tijd genoeg is tussen beide 
processen dan kan de tactiek van vertraging gebruikt worden om beter te 
presteren. Een onderzoek van Jentzsch en Dudschig (2009) toonde aan dat 
vertraging na fouten kleiner is in een taak met veel tijd tussen het antwoord 
en de volgende taak dan in een taak waarbij er weinig tussentijd is. Hierbij 
aansluitend verbeterden de prestaties na het maken van een fout lichtjes bij 
veel tussentijd. Dus de tijd die men heeft na het maken van een fout is 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk een belangrijke voorwaarde om vertraging na fouten te 
doen resulteren in betere prestaties.  
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